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This paper is a study of Union military philosophy during the 
American Civil War. Its specific purpose is to identify and establish 
clearly what is classified here as the Union command problem. Simply 
stated, the command problem was due to the fact that there were two 
schools of generalship, both inadequate; this meant that top leadership 
was usually mediocre since, for different reasons, Union commanders had 
an incomplete idea of war.
The procedure used to study this command problem is, first, to 
examine its origins in eighteenth century European military theory and 
then to study its appearance on the battlefield of the Civil War.
Second, this paper observes the proceedings of the Buell Military 
Commission, a military trial, obsolete in form, that provides the major 
focus of this paper by offering a microcosm in which the two differing 
Union philosophies come to a dramatic, head-on clash.
Eighteenth century European theory is revealed in the experiences 
and writings of Baron Henri Jomini and Marshal Maurice comte de Saxe.
Both presented a "natural art plus science" theory of war that pre­
scribed a balanced formula needed in any general in order to conduct
1
2efficient warfare. The ideas of Jomini and Saxe are used as a benchmark 
against which to judge Union generalship.
On the field of battle, Jomini-s and Saxe's "art-science" 
theory demonstrate the existence of the two incomplete types of Union 
general. One type includes Ulysses S. Grant, William Tecumseh Sherman, 
Philip Sheridan, and John Pope, who were "natural artists" of war in 
their originality, audacity, and initiative; yet they consistently 
failed to consider correctly what Jomini and Saxe also stressed as the 
"textbook" side of war. The result was a lopsided combination of ideas 
in these generals that produced a brand of warfare that was effective 
in hurting the enemy but inefficient and bloody. Audacity and dlan 
replaced close adherence to the basics of science in warfare.
In contrast to this "Grant-Sherman" Union general was a second 
type, represented by Don Carlos Buell, George B, McClellan, William 
Rosecrans, and George Meade. This other kind of general followed a 
philosophy that properly stressed the science of war, but failed to 
combine it with the natural artistry of a Grant or Sherman. As a 
result, type two was often efficient in preparing for battle but in 
little else— engaging and defeating the enemy almost became secondary 
objectives.
These "natural art" and "science oriented" schools of general­
ship in Union command are examined in the courtroom proceedings of what 
was known during the Civil War as the Buell Military Commission.
Behind its doors this Commission served as a microcosm of the command 
problem, with the two sides of the court, the defense and prosecution, 
representing in their contrasting lines of argument an extension of the
3two types of generalship found on the field of battle. The courtroom 
illustration of the command problem represents the climax of this paper.
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ABSTRACT
This paper is a study of Union military philosophy during the 
American Civil War. Its specific purpose is to identify and establish 
clearly what is classified here as the Union command problem. Simply 
stated, the command problem was due to the fact that there were two 
schools of generalship, both inadequate; this meant that top leadership 
was usually mediocre since, for different reasons, Union commanders had 
an incomplete idea of war.
The procedure used to study this command problem is, first, to 
examine its origins in eighteenth century European military theory and 
then to study its appearance on the battlefield of the Civil War,
Second, this paper observes the proceedings of the Buell Military 
Commission, a military trial, obsolete in form, that provides the major 
focus of this paper by offering a microcosm in which the two differing 
Union philosophies come to a dramatic, head-on clash.
Eighteenth century European theory is revealed in the experiences 
and writings of Baron Henri Jomini and Marshal Maurice comte de Saxe.
Both presented a "natural art plus science" theory of war that pre­
scribed a balanced formula needed in any general in order to conduct 
efficient warfare. The ideas of Jomini and Saxe are used as a benchmark 
against which to judge Union generalship.
On the field of battle, Jomini's and Saxe's "art-science" 
theory demonstrate the existence of the two incomplete types of Union 
general. One type includes Ulysses S. Grant, William Tecumseh Sherman,
vi
Philip Sheridan, and John Pope, who were "natural artists" of war in 
their originality, audacity, and initiative; yet they consistently 
failed to consider correctly what Jomini and Saxe also stressed as the 
"textbook" side of war. The result was a lopsided combination of ideas 
in these generals that produced a brand of warfare that was effective 
in hurting the enemy but inefficient and bloody. Audacity and elan 
replaced close adherence to the basics of science in warfare.
In contrast to this "Grant-Sherman" Union general was a second 
type, represented by Don Carlos Buell, George B. McClellan, William 
Rosecrans, and George Meade. This other kind of general followed a 
philosophy that properly stressed the science of war, but failed to 
combine it with the natural artistry of a Grant or Sherman. As a 
result, type two was often efficient in preparing for battle but in 
little else— engaging and defeating the enemy almost became secondary 
objectives.
These "natural art" and "science oriented" schools of general­
ship in Union command are examined in the courtroom proceedings of what 
was known during the Civil War as the Buell Military Commission.
Behind its doors this Commission served as a microcosm of the command 
problem, with the two sides of the court, the defense and prosecution, 
representing in their contrasting lines of argument an extension of the 
two types of generalship found on the field of battle. The courtroom 
illustration of the command problem represents the climax of this paper.
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PREFACE
This paper is actually an intellectual history of one aspect 
of Union command during the Civil War, for its focus is on the qualms, 
patterns of perception, and distinguishing ideas characteristic of two 
schools of thought. The two schools, both individually and collec­
tively, compose the Union command problem.
The command problem which characterized Union generalship was 
responsible for the inadequate leadership that determined the destiny 
of several hundred thousand Union soldiers. This intricate and abstract 
subject is examined on three levels, The first defines the command 
problem, a task that requires a re-interpretation of two important 
military theorists of the eighteenth century, Baron Henri Jomini and 
Marshal Maurice comte de Saxe. Both. Jomini and Saxe prescribed a 
flexible strategy that was desperately needed and that highlights the 
faults of both schools of Union command. The second level of observa­
tion examines the problem in terms of battlefield effects, a procedure 
that goes beyond the general Civil War narrative by tracing and 
analyzing specific incidents of inadequate higher command. The third 
level associates the command problem with an obscure military commission 
that serves as a microcosm of Union military philosophy. This part of 
the paper represents the climax of the study, for in the atmosphere of 
a courtroom the two deficient philosophies of Union battlefield command 
are forced into bold relief.
1
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION: THE BUELL MILITARY COMMISSION AND ITS RELATION 
TO THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY DOCTRINE OF HENRI JOMINI 
AND MARSHAL MAURICE COMTE DE SAXE
On November 27, 1862, the Buell Military Commission convened in 
Cincinnati. The purpose of the Commission was to inquire into the 
operations of the Army of the Ohio under General Don Carlos Buell, 
operations that took place in Kentucky and Tennessee from late 1861 to 
late 1862. The actual investigation concerned itself with the summer 
and early winter months of 1862. The official verdict of the Commission 
was that mistakes had been made by General Buell but that no further 
action should be taken.^ The President and Secretary of War agreed, 
and the matter was dismissed.
In the history of the Civil War, the Buell Commission has been 
relatively forgotten. Few people today know its name, much less the 
reasons for its creation. When mentioned at all, references to the 
Commission are brief but usually unenlightening. This obscurity of 
today is founded in the obscurity of yesterday, for in its own time 
the significance of the Commission did not seem much greater. In form 
the Commission was only one of inquiry or preliminary investigation, 
and thus it did not provide the excitement in the public mind that 
would have been found in the more penetrating investigation of a court- 
martial. The Commission never allowed its proceedings to be publicized
2
3in newspapers or its doors to be opened to the public. In its secrecy 
the Commission virtually guaranteed its obscurity; people could not 
relate to it as they could to the Fitz-John Porter Court-Martial, or 
the McDowell Court of Inquiry, both of which convened at that same time 
with open proceedings. In the first few days of the McDowell Court 
for example, the public was treated to a sensational discussion of 
whether McDowell was seen drunk on the streets of Washington immediately 
after his defeat at Manassas when the Northern capital was considered
2subject to the possibility of a rebel army marching against its door.
In contrast, the only information the public received from the Buell 
Court was the names of the witnesses and when sessions started and 
ended. Sometimes, in desperation, newspapers would try to find more 
to report, but it was rare when they could. Even then their stories 
were not particularly interesting: "The Commission appointed to inquire 
into the Campaign of General Buell, have removed their quarters from 
the rooms lately occupied in the Custom House, to a more spacious 
apartment in Pike's Opera House."
On occasion the public was treated to a glimpse of the proceed­
ings, as when The Murfreesboro Rebel Banner printed letters found in 
the captured baggage of General McCook after the Battle of Stone's
River. One letter contained his brother Daniel's impressions as a
4witness before the Buell Commission. But such occasions were, as 
would be expected, few and far between. The Commission probably had 
little meaning for a public that was unable to follow its proceedings, 
and when no further action was taken against Buell the matter was easy
to forget.
AThe insignificance of the Commission seemed to have reached 
even into the offices of the War Department where its records achieved 
their own special symbol of oblivion. In the first few months after 
arriving at the War Department they were shuffled between the Judge 
Advocate General's office and the Adjutant General's office, then came 
to rest for a few years in a black trunk in one corner of the Judge 
Advocate General's private office. Finally they were put in a proper 
place of storage, but the records were lost by 1870, when a former 
quartermaster of volunteers requested them for his own records. What 
became of them is a mystery. Congressional investigation, moreover, 
revealed that they were the only records of the war years received by 
the War Department whose whereabouts were unexplained. Fortunately 
loss of these original records was less serious than at first thought, 
for the clerk of the Buell Court still retained his own copy of the 
proceedings.^
The unimportant position that history has assigned to the Buell 
Commission is only understandable to a degree. As a representative 
example of military investigation the Commission cannot and does not 
deserve to be given much consideration in comparison with other events 
in the Civil War. Nevertheless, a closer analysis of the content of 
the Commission's proceedings will show that it offers a significant 
contribution to Civil War history, a contribution found in the under­
standing that it conveys of the Union command problem.
The command problem revealed by the Buell Commission varies 
from that which historians usually perceive, and involves a re­
interpretation of the military history of the war. This re-interpretation 
revolves around one of the most important elements of this paper, namely
5the military thought of Henri Jomini and Marshal Maurice comte de Saxe, 
two prominent eighteenth century European theorists on the subject of 
war. Jomini's theories were found in his Precis de l'art de la guerre 
. . . , originally published in 1838, and translated into English by 
0. F. Winship Mendall and E. E. McLean in 1854, (However, Jomini's 
ideas were absorbed into American military thought by the commentaries 
of Henry Halleck, whose Elements of Military Art and Science, published 
in 1846, was almost plagiarized from Jomini.) Saxe's influence came 
via his 1756 publication, Les reveries, ou Memoires sur l'art de la 
guerre de . . . , translated into English by J, Davis in 1811. The 
theories of these two commentators represent the antithesis of Union 
strategic thinking, as revealed by the Commission, and accordingly are 
used in subsequent chapters as a standard by which to judge the opinions 
of General Buell, his like-minded colleagues, and their opposite-minded 
counterparts of Union command.
Both interpretations of the Union command problem are based on 
the writings of Jomini and Saxe, but the dissimilarity between today's 
conventional interpretation and that of the commission pertains to the 
perception of a flaw in the military philosophy of the leading members 
of the Union general officer corps— a flaw that meant a narrow-minded 
attitude toward any strategic or tactical requirements that contradicted 
prej udices.
For the historian who accepts the current standard interpreta­
tion, the command problem applies to a group of Union generals that 
included such notables as George McClellan, George Meade, Don Carlos 
Buell, and William Rosecrans. These generals represented an apparent 
philosophical adherence to the discredited eighteenth century theory of
6Jomini, and to a lesser degree Saxe, which, seemed inappropriate to the 
Civil War situation. In effect this group of Union generals shared a 
professional attitude towards war, attributed to Jomini and Saxe, that 
was unreal and extreme— an attitude that stressed war as only a science 
of plansj diagrams, and textbook rules, and that did not include such 
unsavory realities as bloodshed, chance, or risk. This customary view 
of the command problem also includes another group of generals, who, 
being disassociated from the Jominian past, represented a "modern" 
generalship appropriate to the Civil War situation. This group included 
Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan, among others.
T. Harry Williams is perhaps the most outstanding exponent of 
this standard view of the command problem, and he offers a primary 
example in his article on Civil War generalship in Why the North Won 
the Civil War.^  For Williams, Jomini was the typical eighteenth century 
general, submerged in a blackboard world of geometric diagrams, opera­
tional lines, plans, and rules meant to permit one to wage war without 
risk; such an approach, thought Williams, set back the science of war 
a full century.^ For the purpose of promoting systematic study of wars, 
Jomini put into each of his plans "a theater of operations, a base of 
operations, a zone of operations, and so forth. . . . Essentially his
g
purpose was to introduce rationality and system into the study of war."
The science-orientated military past (as we shall call it) of 
Jomini, and of Saxe as well, inspired Williams to imagine white-gloved 
generals playing a nearly bloodless game of war in a gentlemanly fashion, 
with, objectives achieved and grievances satisfied by the book, and little
harm done in the process:
7Jomini confessed that he disliked the destructiveness of the 
warfare of his time. "I acknowledge," he wrote, "that my prejudices 
are in favor of the good old times when the French and English guards 
courteously invited each other to fire first as at Fontenoy.
. . . "  He said that he preferred "chivalric war" to "organized 
assassination," and he deplored as particularly cruel and terrible 
what he called wars of "opinion," or as we would say today, of 
"ideas." War was, as it should be, most proper and polite when it 
was directed by professional armies for limited objectives. All 
this is, of course, readily recognizable as good eighteenth-century 
doctrine. This could be Marshal Saxe saying: "I do not favor 
pitched battles . . . and I am convinced that a skillful general 
could make war all his life without being forced into one." 
Eighteenth-century warfare was leisurely and its ends were limited.
It stressed maneuver rather than battle. . . . Most important of 
all, war was regarded as kind of an exercise or game to be conducted 
by soldiers,^
Williams applies this eighteenth century military philosophy to 
Union command, examining a culprit group of Union generals who, being 
disciples of Jomini and Saxe, were textbook addicts in their conduct of 
warfare. These were generals who, like Jomini, "proposed to conduct it 
IwarJ in accordance with the standards and the strategy of an earlier 
and easier military age,"^^ and who "hoped to accomplish their objec­
tives by maneuvering rather than f i g h t i n g . O n e  such general, 
according to Williams, was George B. McClellan, who thought that Manassas 
and Yorktown were his "brightest chaplets" because he seized them by 
"pure military skill" and without "loss of life," even though he failed 
to hurt the enemy in both cases. Williams also ridicules McClellan's 
squeamish reaction after the Battle of Fair Oakes, as he went "mooning 
around the field anguishing over the dead," and wrote his wife that the 
"charms from victory" were replaced by the "sickening sight" of the
battlefield. As Williams notes, such a squeamish reaction "may seem
13strange to the modern mind, but Jomini would have understood."
Another member of this out-dated class of Union generals who understood 
only an impotent warfare of the past, was Don Carlos Buell, whom
8Williams compares to the inane "spirit of Marshal Saxe," Just as Saxe 
is quoted as absurdly stating "that campaigns could be carried out and 
won without engaging in a single battle," Buell contended that "war has 
a higher purpose than that of mere bloodshed."^ General Meade's weak- 
kneed confession of shame "for his cause when he was ordered to seize 
the property of a Confederate sympathizer,"^ parallels Williams' 
quotation of Chesterfield's mocking statement that eighteenth, century 
warfare was "pusillanimously carried on in this degenerate age; quarter 
is given; towns are taken and people spared; even in a storm, a woman 
can hardly hope for the benefit of a rape."^
Completing what is now the conventional interpretation of the 
command problem, Williams also examines the new breed, the so-called 
"modern" Union commanders, whose generalship was produced by the American 
Civil War, and whose ideas were in direct contrast to the European 
military tradition of Jomini and Saxe. Grant is Williams' primary 
example of this new model of general, for Ire displayed an original 
spontaneity towards combat that reflected war as a natural art, entail­
ing risk, in which elements such as "character of will" and "common
17
sense" rose above the "dogmas of traditional warfare." Williams 
underlines Grant's contention that "if men make war in slavish observance 
of rules, they will fail. . . . War is progressive, because all instru­
ments and elements of war are progressive, which was an obvious 
reference to Jominian theory. Williams ends his article with Lincoln's 
evaluation of Grant's strategy late in the war, which the President 
summed up: "Those not skinning can hold a leg." Williams concluded 
that "at least for the Civil War" Lincoln's observation "had more 
validity than anything written by Baron Jomini.
9These eighteenth century militarists were, however, much more 
complex than Williams and others like him tend to believe. In their 
interpretation of the ideas of Jomini and Saxe these historians have 
over simplified to the point of misrepresentation. Close examination 
of Jomini and Saxe reveals that they were not bound to rules. Instead, 
contrary to strict regimentation, their thought included an important 
degree of flexibility and reason. They were not simple, narrow-minded, 
white-gloved theorists, who saw war as something to be conducted in a 
bloodless, prim, and proper manner, closely regulated by the restrictive 
rules of military science. In his famous Fontenoy statement, for 
example ("l acknowledge that my prejudices are in favor of the good old 
times when the French and English guard courteously invited each to 
fire first at Fontenoy"), Jomini did not necessarily present the 
image of a general who, as Williams puts it, shriveled away from "the 
destructiveness of the warfare of his time," and preferred instead 
warfare that was "most proper and polite." Jomini was more reasonable 
than these remarks may indicate. His statement on Fontenoy, placed in 
context, was a comparison of two opposite extremes. Of the two he 
preferred Fontenoy over a civil war atmosphere that meant mob rule.
The latter method of warfare he had personally observed in Spain during 
the Napoleonic wars: " . . .  a frightful epoch when priests, women 
and children plotted the murder of isolated soldiers." That Jomini did 
not really prefer either method is found in his search for a middle 
road between "these contests between the people [mob warfare] and 22the old regular method of war between permanent armies [Fontenoy]."
Williams' basic idea that Jomini looked to the past and prefer­
red a more regulated warfare had some truth to it. However, Jomini
10
looked to the past for its ability to provide the rules he had hoped 
to see in the warfare of Napoleon. This did not mean that he totally 
disapproved of the warfare of his day, for he could become very excited 
about Bonaparte:
To be indefatigable in ascertaining the approximate position of the 
enemy, to fall with the rapidity of lighting upon his center if his 
front was too much extended, or upon that flank by which he could 
move more readily seize his communications, to outflank him, to cut 
his line, to pursue him to the last, to disperse and destroy his 
forces,-— such was the system followed by Napoleon in his first 
campaigns. These campaigns proved this system to be one of the 
very best.23
Yet Napoleon's method, although "one of the very best," was not complete 
for Jomini: "Napoleon abused the system; but this does not disprove its 
real advantages when a proper limit is assigned to its enterprises and 
they are made in harmony with the respective conditions of the armies 
and of the adjoining states." He thus leaned toward a conservative 
philosophy of warfare, not as an escape from military reality, but as 
a necessary ingredient needed to make Napoleon's system more structured 
and complete.
In a summary statement on Napoleon, Jomini proposed a compro­
mise between the system of wars of position, which he recognized as 
outdated ("It is probable that the old system of wars of position will 
for a long time be proscribed, or that, if adopted, it will be much 
modified and improved"), and Napoleon's method, which he felt would be 
disastrous for society if adopted completely. The latter, he stated, 
was not "materially different from the devastations of the barbarian 
hordes between the fourth and thirteenth centuries." His plan was to 
utilize the best qualities of both systems, which meant " . . .  a
mixed system of war,--^a mean between the rapid incursions of Napoleon
11
and the slow system of positions of the last century.” In the end, 
however, Jomini realized that his ideas belonged to the future. The 
present was still Napoleon's and had to be accepted, regardless of the 
need for a little more attention to the military past. "Until then" he 
remarked, "we must expect to retain this system {Napoleon's] of marches, 
which has produced so great results; for the first to renounce it in 
the presence of an active and capable enemy would probably be a victim 
to his indiscretion.
Marshal Saxe also displayed flexibility in his understanding
of war. Williams uses Saxe's famous quote C"l do not favor pitched
battles, and I am convinced that a skillful general could make war all
his life without being forced into one" °), as an example of eighteenth-
27century military aversion to fighting. But this greatly over­
simplifies our impressions of Saxe, who has been described as a leader 
of new ideas, a great "innovator" who discovered new ways to defeat and 
destroy one's enemy.28 placed in context, Saxe's statement did imply 
that he did not like battle, but this does not necessarily mean that he 
was against fighting when properly prepared. Williams fails to mention 
that in the same paragraph Saxe talked about "frequent combats, to 
dissolve so to speak the enemy"; "when one finds the opportunity of 
crushing the enemy"; and "after a victory a general should not be content 
with having gained a battlefield." These words hardly describe a general 
with a lethargic attitude towards battle. This is not to say that Saxe 
was another Napoleon. He was conservative on the battlefield, but 
Williams went too far in defining this conservatism. Saxe's dislike of 
battle only applied to those that were fought hastily, without being 
prepared. For the one clear theme in Saxe's statement is not an
12
unwillingness to fight, but, on the contrary, the demand that war is to
be prepared "without putting anything to chance; and that is the per-
29fection and ability in a general."
This more complex, flexible, and reasonable theoretical 
interpretation of these two generals represents the antithesis of the 
Union command problem as reflected in the Buell Commission. The 
writings of Jomini and Saxe actually support not only the science-and— 
rules philosophy of generals like Buell and McClellan, but also the 
art-and-risk philosophy of men like Sherman and Grant. At the same 
time, the eighteenth century past, as reflected in Jomini and Saxe, 
refuted the ideas of both schools of warfare. In short, Jomini and 
Saxe recognized that war was not a white-gloved game regulated by 
science and rules, nor was it simply a matter of art in knowing what 
risks to take. Rather war was a balance between a flexible science 
and natural art, with the commander needing equal proportions of both 
to be successful.
For Jomini and Saxe the science of war consisted of numerous
rules, principles, theories, and systems. The subjects of these dictums
ranged from maintenance of soldiers' health to strategy and tactics.
In this latter category, Jomini had no problem devising eleven lines of
operation, Doubles lines of operations, Interior lines, Exterior lines,
30Concentric lines, Divergent lines, Accidental lines, and the like.
He also proposed twelve Orders of Battle, including Simple parallel
order, Parallel order with a crotchet, Parallel order reinforced upon
31one wing or upon center, Oblique order, Order concave in the center.
Some rules were more or less permanent, such as the need for speed, 
mobility, concentration, awareness of time, initiative, achieving the
13
decisive point in battle, and engaging the masses of one's army against 
the fractions of the enemy. These were rules that indicated standard 
regulations, the hasics to be used always in moving efficiently against 
the enemy.
But most of the rules, principles, and systems of Jomini and 
Saxe were not permanent in the sense implied by Williams. They did not 
prevent war by reducing it to a meticulously regulated game. Instead, 
the rules laid down by Saxe and Jomini were intended to increase flexi­
bility by permitting effective engagement of the enemy while simul­
taneously offering possible means to prevent the madness of war from 
reaching a point comparable to mass murder, In this sense, the theories 
and rules of Jomini and Saxe reflected not a static warfare of 
interwoven designs and geometric exercises, but rather a sense of 
flexibility indicating numerous ways one could efficiently and effec­
tively engage the enemy with a minimum of risk. After listing his 
twelve orders of battle, (which Williams used as proof of a fond regard
n ofor disciplined warfare-3^ ), Jomini observed that "these different 
orders are not to be understood precisely as the geometrical figures 
indicate them. A general who would expect to arrange his line of battle 
as regularly as upon paper or on a drill-ground would be greatly 
mistaken, and would be likely to suffer defeat." And, as if sensing 
the criticism of future historians like Williams, he added, "I repeat 
that a line of battle never was a regular geometrical figure, and when 
such figures are used in discussing the combinations of tactics it can 
only be for the purpose of giving definite expression to an idea by the
O Ouse of a known symbol."
14
When he was specific about the flexibility of the rules of 
warfare, Jomini discussed the objective point of an army, carefully 
distinguishing between the "geographical objective" (capital or 
province), and the "objective point of maneuver" (which relates to the 
destruction of the hostile army). Jomini's own preference between 
these two objectives, so opposite in nature, is hard to judge. The war 
of invasion ("geographical objective") is a key point in his writing, 
yet he also reacted favorably to Napoleon and his use of the "objective 
point of maneuver." "The best means of accomplishing great results," 
wrote Jomini in quoting Napoleon, "was to dislodge and destroy the 
hostile army— since states and provinces fall of themselves when there 
is no organized force to protect them." His final choice seems to 
have been a combination of both, except in the event of special circum­
stances :
In cases where there are powerful reasons for avoiding all 
risk, it may be prudent to aim only at the acquisition of partial 
advantages,— such as the capture of a few towns or the possession 
of adjacent territory. In other cases, where a party has the 
means of achieving a great success by incurring great dangers, he 
may attempt the destruction of the hostile army, as did Napoleon.^
Other rules were of the same flexible nature. Jomini's famous maxim of
"interior lines" was not excluded from his assertion that "every maxim
has its exceptions" or his statement that great possibilities were
never exploited against Frederick's use of the "interior line" maxim
37in the Seven Years War. Describing rules for the supply of armies in 
the field, he included all the obvious and not-so-obvious needs of an 
army, from the rations to be carried to the relationship of an army 
with the inhabitants of a country. But these rules suddenly become 
less meaningful when one reads this summary remark:
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I will end this article by recording a remark of Napoleon 
which may appear whimsical, but which is still not without reason.
He said that in his first campaigns the enemy was so well provided 
that when his troops were in want of supplies he had only to fall 
upon the rear of the enemy to procure everything in abundance.
This is a remark upon which it would be absurd to found a system, 
but which perhaps explains the success of many a rash enterprise, 
and proves how much actual war differs from narrow theory,38
One should not conclude that since the rules of war were flexi­
ble therefore they were not important in eighteenth century warfare. 
Jomini also pointed out that
a system which is not in accordance with the principles of war 
cannot be good. I lay no claim to the creation of these principles, 
for they have always existed, and were applied by Caesar, Scipio 
and the Consul Nero, as well as by Marlborough and Eugene.^9
But "in accordance with" did not necessarily mean strict adherence to
one set of rules. Saxe perhaps best sums up the flexible attitude,
showing the science of war to be a means of engaging the enemy and not
an end in itself:
Many commanders in chief have been so limited in the ideas of war­
fare, that when events have brought the contest to issue, and two 
rival armies have been drawn out for action, their whole attention 
has devolved upon a straight alignment, an equality of step, or a 
regular distance in intervals of column.^
Science was not the only part of war recognized by Jomini and 
Saxe, for war also required the less tangible quality of natural art.
This natural art applied to the general himself, to the inward genius 
that could not be taught but was reflected instead in intuitive qualities 
that were born in him. It is this aspect of war that T. Harry Williams 
praised in the modern generalship of Grant, in contrast to the eighteenth 
century scientific approach of the Buell-McClellan type of general. This 
is noted in Williams' contention that the qualities of "character or will 
and "common sense" were the essence of Grant's success.^ He proceeded 
to attribute the greatness of a commander to intangibles like "mental
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strength" and "moral power," and quoted Napoleon's remark that "the 
personality of the general is indispensable, he is the head, he is the 
all of an army. The Gauls were not conquered by Roman legions, but by 
Caesar.
It was a mystical, imprecise, artistic quality that Williams 
thought was directly related to the intuitive level of war. Here war 
went beyond science and textbook tools, and included the risk, danger, 
chaos, and tribulation that Clausewitz referred to as the decisive 
moments of war,
when things no longer move on of themselves, like a well-oiled 
machine, but the machine itself begins to offer resistance, and 
to overcome this, the commander must have great force of will.
. . . By the spark in his breast, by the light of his spirit, the
spark of purpose, the light of hope, must be kindled afresh in all
others.
Marshal Saxe and Jomini understood well this natural art, the 
qualities needed in a commander to deal with war's unpredictability.
For Saxe the natural art of war meant that "unless a man is born with
a talent for war, he will never be other than a mediocre general." He
describes this "talent" as an inborn, self-assuring quality. "The 
general," he wrote,
ought to possess a talent for sudden and happy resources. To have 
an art of penetrating into other men, and of remaining impenetrable 
himself; he should be endowed with a capacity prepared for every­
thing, with activity accompanied by judgment, with skill to make a 
proper choice upon all occasion, and with an exactness of 
discernment; to be a stranger to hatred, to punish without mercy, 
and especially those who are most dear to him.1^
Saxe came closer to grasping the essence of the art of war when he
observed that "war is a science covered with darkness, in the obscurity
of which one can not move with assured step; habit and prejudice make
up its base, the natural result of ignorance. 45 It is in dealing with
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this "darkness," hinted at here by a need for originality, that Saxe 
discerned the natural artistry of war.
Jomini was more direct in discussing the natural art of war.
He described the risk of war that science and rules could neither 
predict nor prevent:
Strategy, particularly, may indeed be regulated by fixed laws 
resembling those of positive sciences, but this is not true of war 
viewed as a whole. Among other things, combats may be mentioned 
as often being quite independent of scientific combinations, and 
they may become essentially dramatic, personal qualities and inspira­
tions and a thousand other things frequently being the controlling 
elements. The passions which agitate the masses that are brought 
into collision, the warlike qualities of these masses, the energy 
and talent of their commanders, the spirit, more or less marital, 
of nations and epochs— -in a word, everything that can be called the 
poetry and metaphysics of war,-— will have a permanent influence on 
its results.^
I
In dealing with the risk of war, Jomini, like Saxe, acknowledged 
that something more than textbook principles was required by a general, 
that a "special talent," a quality of artistry, was also needed:
In this important crisis of battles, theory becomes an uncertain 
guide; for it is then unequal to the emergency, and can never compare 
in value with a natural talent for war, nor be a sufficient substi­
tute for that intuitive coup-d' oeil imparted by experience in 
battles to a general of tried bravery and coolness. . . .
I will repeat what I was the first to announce:— "that war is 
not an exact science, but a drama full of passion; that the moral 
qualities, the talents, the executive foresight and ability, the 
greatness of character, of the leaders . . . have a great influence 
upon it . . .  " I appreciate thoroughly the difference between the 
directing principles of combinations arranged in the quiet of the 
closet, and that special talent which is indispensable to the indi-^  
vidual who has, amidst the noise and confusion of battle, to keep a 
hundred thousand men co-operating toward the attainment of one 
single object.
This "special talent" was
the special executive ability and the well-balanced penetrating 
mind which distinguish the practional man from the one who knows 
only what others teach him. I confess that no book can introduce 
those things into a head where the germ does not previously exist 
by nature. ^
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The flexible theories of both Jomini and Saxe represent the 
antithesis of the military philosophies of both schools of thought 
(science-and-rules versus art-and-risk) among Union commanders. In this 
sense, both Union philosophies (though quite opposite from each other) 
are seriously flawed, as the conflict in the Buell Military Commission 
indicates. Like Jomini and Saxe, the "Buell-McClellan" generals recog­
nized the science of war, but in failing to recognize and accept the 
risk of war, this science becomes not the flexible adjustment to 
inevitably unforeseen conditions of combat ("every maxim has its 
exceptions"),^ but an extreme and rigid end in itself to prevent war 
and combat, blood and risk. And in an opposite but equally tragic 
reflection of inadequacy, the "Grant-Sherman" generals illustrate the 
natural art of war when confronted with what Clausewitz referred to as 
the decisive moments in war "when things no longer move of themselves, 
and which Saxe stated was a time when "war is a science covered with 
darkness.However, in their inability to recognize correctly the 
science (rules) of war, these generals doomed their troops and their 
country to suffer needlessly bloody encounters which reflected a callous 
disregard of ways to minimize risk. This type of general had as 
inadequate a conception of war as his textbookish, rule-oriented 
counterpart.
This, then, was the command problem illustrated by the Buell 
Military Commission. Both groups of Union generals had an incomplete 
conception of military strategy that goes beyond the conventional 
interpretation of T. Harry Williams and other historians. The command 
problem was too complex to blame one group of generals or another. 
Northerners looked with the same amount of wonder and disbelief at
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their generals in 1864 and 1865 (Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan), as they 
had in 1861 and 1862 (Buell, McClellan, and Rosecrans); the difference 
was that in the later years their discontent was increasingly focused 
on the bloodbaths created by victory instead of the limited results 
achieved by defeat. On the battlefield, under pressure, the two schools 
of thought emphasized opposing philosophical values which, if brought 
together, would have meant a combination of the natural art and science 
of war necessary to produce the complete general.
The Buell Commission represented a microcosm of this command 
problem. The rule-orientated conservatism of the Meades, McClellans, 
and Buells was found in the role of the Commission defense (Buell and 
his witnesses).. The original, artistic but impetuous, hazardous, 
unscientific attitude of generals such as Grant and Sherman was found 
in the role of the prosecution (Commission Board and witnesses).
This microcosm is incomplete, however, without a better under­
standing of the wider world it explains. In order to observe the defense 
role in the Commission as a microcosm of the conservative military 
thought of generals such as Don Carlos Buell, it is first necessary to 
understand why McClellan considered war to be an endless game that 
consisted only of grand strategy and preparation, or why Meade was 
satisfied with a defensive policy at Gettysburg that allowed Lee to 
escape. We must also recognize and understand widespread Northern 
frustration with this type of general, for that too becomes part of 
establishing the conservative tone of his ideas.
By the same token, the prosecution will be fully understood 
only by recognizing and understanding why (for example) Grant in the 
Vicksburg Campaign and at Cold Harbor, and Sherman at Kennesaw Mountain,
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threw away strategy and resorted to suicidal attacks, hoping that 
great numbers would bring victory against a well entrenched enemy, At 
the same time, we must understand the growing desire in Northern 
society for total war that was associated with this type of general.
This atmosphere surrounded him, and established him, and therefore 
becomes necessary to understand his boldness. The wider world of this 
microcosm, these two groups of Union generals, will be examined in 
Chapters Two and Three. Only then can the value of the Commission as 
a microcosm of the Union command problem be judged.
The Buell-McClellan generals were prominent early in the war. 
While the Grants and Shermans were still getting their bearings, Buell 
and< other commanders like him were already in the thick of the confusion 
and combat which the war created. The activity of the conservative 
generals was therefore the first indication that a command problem
existed.
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CHAPTER II
THE BUELLS AND THE McCLELLANS: THE 
SCIENCE AND RULES OF WARFARE
In the Civil War world of the North, the "Buell-McClellan" 
archetype, who represented half of the Union command problem, was a 
common entity, easy to identify and label; he was slow in movement and 
short on results.'*' Public opinion generally held such commanders in
low esteem; this sentiment was shared by Lincoln, who referred, in what
■
were some of his best colloquial gems, to McClellan as a general who
2"has got the slows," to Rosecrans after Chickamauga as "stunned like a 
duck hit on the head,"^ and to Meade after Gettysburg as "an old woman 
trying to shoo her geese across a creek.
This condescending characterization of McClellan, Buell, and 
their fellows was based upon their reputation as commanders who always 
presented a neutral image. They attained neither high achievement nor 
suffered catastrophic failure. They achieved consistent results but 
never outstanding results, and their fates were often due less to the 
enemy than to unfavorable circumstances such as weather or supplies. 
Such was the color in which the campaigns of Don Carlos Buell were seen 
(see Appendices A-(-C in reference to Buell's campaigns). Buell's first 
major campaign, for example, resulted in the capture of Bowling Green
and Nashville, both important strategic positions in the West. But the
5bells of victory rang for Grant, for he also had been on the move, and
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in capturing Fort Henry and Fort Donelson he had cracked the center of 
widely extended Confederate lines from Columbia, Missouri, to the Cum­
berland Mountains, and had opened the Mississippi, Cumberland, and 
Tennessee Rivers for movement south. It was victory by Grant that made 
Buell's achievement look pale, for it threatened the flank of Albert 
Sidney Johnston's Confederates, forcing them to evacuate Bowling Green 
and Nashville before Buell's arrival.
Yet, if the bells of victory did not ring for Buell in his first 
major campaign, nevertheless such qualified success did not mean failure; 
instead it was achievement with strings attached. This was indirectly 
revealed by the nature of attacks on Buell by Northern newspapers, which, 
as if trying to make up their minds, decided to be negative. These 
attacks were not the vicious kind reserved for catastrophe, nor were they 
marked by ridicule that was never forgotten. Rather, they were chiding 
remarks produced by the frustrating realization that something had been 
accomplished but not enough.
The newspaper criticism seemed to be centered around two rather 
meaningless themes. One was the suggestion that Buell could have made 
Grant's victories easier. This is typified by the New York Daily 
Tribune's statement that Buell, in not moving simultaneously with Grant, 
had allowed the rebel force at Bowling Green to "evacuate that position 
unmolested and at leisure and send a large portion of its force to 
strengthen the defenders at Fort D o n elson.This  line of reasoning 
was tenable but somewhat out of place amid the celebration of the Fort 
Henry and Fort Donelson victories and the fact that Grant captured any 
troops that were sent to reinforce his adversaries. The other critical 
theme was even more meaningless, reflecting excessive concern for what 
the rebels at Bowling Green and Nashville had managed to get away with
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in their evacuation. Buell acquired the somewhat negative reputation
as a commander whose laxity of movement meant allowing the Confederates
to "dismount the I siege-guns, and carry them away, with all the munitions
yand baggage for an army of thirty thousand."
After taking Nashville and Bowling Green, Buell also achieved
his objectives in a second campaign that required him to move west to
meet Grant at Pittsburg Landing and then move south with him to capture
Corinth. These objectives were met only after confusing incidents which
underlined his mediocre reputation. One of these was the battle of
Shiloh, which took place on April 6 and 7, 1862. Shiloh was more
puzzling and confusing than most battles of the war because of green
troops, a surprise attack by the enemy, and devastating slaughter that
was still a new epcperience for both sides. Buell’s association with
Shiloh only added to its confusion and puzzlement. His reinforcement
of Grant on the first day of battle was a major factor in saving the
Union forces and Was clearly recognized as such:
General Buell with General Nelson's division arrived at 4'oclock 
and turned the tide of battle. . . .
. . , Had General Buell's force not been seen just at hand, 
our army might possibly have been stampeded and destroyed. But 
Buell came in sight before nightfall, crossed the river as rapidly 
as possible, was in battle array when the second morning dawned, 
and then, it was our turn to advance.^
In contrast to this recognition, was the generally acknowledged incompe­
tence of Northern
the New York Daily Tribune as "mismanagement and criminal weakness.'
commanders at Shiloh, which was tersely described in
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Add to this editorial judgment the inescapable fact of Buell's delay 
before the battle due to the destruction of the Duck River Bridge, which 
prompted the accusation that, although Buell had indeed saved Grant, 
Grant would not have needed so much saving had not Buell displayed a
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"delatoriness" I^ ic] that "nearly inflicted disaster at Pittsburg 
Landing."^® Buell's helpfulness to Grant was also considerably 
diminished by thd dolorous mood that possessed even the victor following 
such a bloody end. result as Shiloh. It was a mood that, as the 
Cincinnati Enquirer correctly stated, found the "feeling of rejoicing
over victory . . . painfully mingled with the sadness of so extensive 
a national bereavement.
After Shiloh, Buell's Army, along with the armies of the 
Tennessee and Mississippi, moved forward under General Henry W. Halleck 
and captured the Confederate stronghold at Corinth, Mississippi. This 
movement showed that lessons learned at Shiloh had been learned too 
well. The failure to take precautionary steps, which had led to the 
problems at Shilojh, persuaded Halleck to make a series of carefully 
entrenched movements in which the Union forces moved only twenty-five 
miles in thirty days. And in moving too far in the direction of caution 
Halleck's strategly produced only the facade of victory. The strategic 
situation remained basically the same as after Shiloh. The North 
scored a victory, but again it proved to be dubious; although it 
resulted in the capture of Corinth without a fight, it was also without 
an enemy army, for, almost as if tired of waiting, the rebels had 
slipped away.
This movement placed Buell in a position that was similar to 
that he had occupied after Bowling Green and Nashville, with much the 
same public response, Corinth was an extremely important strategic 
position that commanded communications to Memphis, the Gulf, and the 
seaboard states; f)ut its capture caused dismay among Northerners, who 
watched an entire Confederate army march away without loss. And Buell,
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although not alohe, was again associated with mediocre achievement. 
Northern newspapers again made harsh, chiding criticisms of Union 
generals who displayed in their sluggishness a consistent uncertainty 
as to whether "t(j> attack or be attacked," and whose achievement allowed 
the enemy "quietly and at leisure to transfer themselves elsewhere" 
only to "fall upon our lines with superior force in the future.
The second half of Buell's final year as a major participant in 
the Civil War was little different from the first. His campaigns still 
seemed indecisive. From Corinth he moved on his own to capture 
Chattanooga, but the movement resulted in nothing substantial. It only 
proved again an already proven common-sense theory, most obviously 
reflected in Napoleon's fatal march from Moscow in 1812, that a march 
through unfriendly territory without adequate means of supply could 
never be successful. Buell had insufficient cavalry and more than 
three hundred miles of supply lines in generally hostile countryside to 
protect against such foes as John Hunt Morgan and Nathan Bedford Forrest.
Aside from these "natural" problems, Buell was also burdened by 
more than his share of incompetent subordinates. His small cavalry 
force was destroyed in the Battle of Hartsville on August 20, 1862, 
after he had specifically warned its commander, General R. W. Johnson, 
of the need to consider reinforcements and support before moving to meet 
the enemy. There were also officers like Colonel Rodney Mason who at 
Clarksville unhesitantly surrendered 175 to 200 well-entrenched men to 
a rebel force that was not much larger, and in the process gave up 
desperately needed supplies which "were accumulating at that point to a 
considerable a m o u n t . S o  serious was this offense that four days 
later Colonel Mason was "by order of the President of the United States,
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cashiered for repeated acts of cowardice in the face of the enemy.
Another incompetent officer lost an extremely important position at 
Gallatin, Tennessee, on the major supply line to Louisville, when he 
failed to build ordered stockades and set out adequate pickets. The 
result was the destruction of a valuable tunnel and several bridges.
Facing such problems, Buell, not surprisingly, failed. His failure was 
not very great, but certainly little praise was in order. The problems 
that engulfed Buell caused him to seem uncommonly slow, a fact that 
struck a negative note in the North. "His campaign in Alabama is so 
much wasted time, utterly wasted, s t a t e d  one newspaper, while 
another remarked that "an army that simply holds its ground in an 
enemy's country is on the high road to speedy dilapidation."I® But 
slowness and delay were not any real disaster, and although it took 
two months of repairing bridges and roads, and frequent resort to half 
rations, Buell still managed to arrive before Chattanooga. Unfortunately, 
an unexpected event, which was to lead him into his last campaign, pre­
vented him from capturing this coveted objective, forcing him once again 
to give the public an impression of indecisive success.
Arriving before Chattanooga, Buell found that the Confederate 
force led by Braxton Bragg had decided to invade Union-occupied middle 
Tennessee. Buell's answer to this rebel invasion was a series of incon­
clusive counter moves that resulted in accomplishing primary objectives 
that proved to be of secondary importance. Bragg's invasion of 
Tennessee, and eventually his turn north into southern Kentucky, caused 
Buell to move to protect Nashville, Bowling Green, and Louisville, all 
of which were important points. But Buell's moves, although important, 
did not resolve the major problem: Bragg's army. Buell mistook his
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immediate objectives, which became clearly evident when Bragg was
allowed to capture Munfordsvllle and its garrison of four thousand
Union troops, while Buell was on the watchful defensive at Nashville,
After arriving at Louisville, and receiving reinforcements and
supplies, Buell finally moved against Bragg and met him in the Battle
of Perryville on October 8, 1862. It was a battle that proved to be
even more inconclusive than most during a war in which the victor
usually suffered equal or greater casualties than the vanquished.^
Perryville also offered its own inconclusiveness, due to an oddity of
weather and geography that enabled only one third of the victorious
Union forces to participate against almost the entire rebel army.^ It
was< a special inconclusiveness that once again dimmed the glory of Don
Carlos Buell. The enemy had retreated; the threat to Kentucky was
repulsed; but the battle was not much of a victory, As Horace Greeley
sarcastically observed in the New York Tribune,
Bragg starts on his backward march, and, in order to make things 
easy, falls with nearly his whole force on a portion of Buell's 
near Perryville, and handles it pretty roughly. Of course, he 
retreats when our reinforcements come up, and our folks raise a 
shout of victory. Where are its trophies? What arms, baggage, 
prisoners have we taken?21
After Perryville, Buell followed Bragg's retreating army and, 
consistent with his indecisiveness, ended both his uninspiring campaign 
and his Civil War career at one stroke by failing to engage or seriously 
hurt the Confederate force; instead, he simply nudged it back from 
whence it came. It was a last act that proved hard to understand even 
for the pro-Buell Chicago Daily Tribune, which, trying to establish a 
positive tone, instead seemed to provide an unconvincing epitaph:
"Bragg came here with the intention of permanently occupying Kentucky
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and capturing Louisville and Cincinnati. Buell has defeated him in his
22cherished plans. The defeat is Bragg's not Buell's." Put in academic 
terms, Don Carlos Buell's performance ranged from B minus to C plus.
The partial successes which marked Buell's career also typified 
such Union generals as McClellan, Meade, and Rosecrans, who had their 
Perryvilles on the Peninsula, at Gettysburg, Iuka, and Stone's River.
The explanation for the inconsequential achievements of Buell and this 
group of generals was found in surrounding circumstances such as Buell's 
misadventures with weather (rivers, mud, desolated areas for supply) 
and his indirect and direct involvement with fellow officers. Yet such 
circumstances are not enough to explain the ineffectiveness of these 
conservative generals. It is also a question of attitude. The reason 
for the hollowness of Buell's victory at Bowling Green and Nashville 
was not only that Grant's victories at Forts Henry and Donelson removed 
the rebel obstacle (Albert Sidney Johnston's army), but also that Buell 
hesitated when first asked to move against Bowling Green simultaneously 
with Grant's movement. This pause betrayed the attitude that war must 
be a sure thing. Buell conjectured to his superior that Bowling Green 
was "strongly fortified behind a river, by obstructions on the roads 
land] . . .  by the condition of the roads themselves."2^ Such doubts 
caused one of his subordinate officers to exclaim in frustration, "it 
rains a little, then snows a little, then freezes a little, then thaws 
a great deal, and finally everything on the surface of the ground seems 
liquid earth. All of this from being compelled to remain in the same 
spot."24
In the next movement, to Nashville, Buell's doubts extended to 
logistics. Authorities in Washington kept reminding Buell of the need 
for speed:
33
If I can send you motive power and cars to Bowling Green by way 
of Green River, can you not at once advance on Nashville in force 
without waiting for repairs of road? Time is now everything . . .
Leave tents and all baggage. If you can occupy Nashville at once
it will end the war in Tennessee, . . ,
The advance on Nashville is the greatest importance. If you
can make it by the line of the Cumberland more rapidly than by 
Bowling Green at once change your line of operations.^ 5
Buell consistently showed a preference for everything but the enemy and
Nashville as he thought of methods to gain supplies:
I hope to facilitate our progress materially by throwing boats above 
the broken lock while the river is up, which by transhipment will 
enable us to get many of our supplies that way, and give us that as 
well as the railroad. Boats will start up today.26
The strong relationship between attitude and result extends
throughout other phases of Buell's campaigns. His decision to build a
permanent frame bridge across the Duck River was a major factor in his
27tardy arrival at Shiloh. His prerequisite consideration of honor
and the well-being of loyal citizens on his march to Chattanooga, when
added to his numerous other troubles, created the delay that allowed
28Bragg to reach the coveted city and secure it before him. And in the 
march to Corinth, Buell again displayed an attitude proportionate to 
the final result by his failure to keep up with the more aggressively 
led, faster moving armies of Sherman and Pope. This attitude may be 
observed in the telegrams sent between Halleck, Pope, Sherman, and Buell 
concerning a planned simultaneous movement to Seven Mile Creek during 
the advance on Corinth. Buell, on the Union center, sought perfect 
safety and was unconcerned with delay as he informed his commander that 
he could "advance whenever it suits you, though," he added, "perhaps 
better after tomorrow. . . .  I will have further examination made of 
the ground beyond by scouts." The need for "further examination" pro­
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duced a somewhat forlorn reaction from Pope on the left wing. "General 
Buell," he complained,
was unwilling to move this morning until he examined the ground he 
was to occupy, and 1 have been out with him ever since this morning. 
Is it not too late to reach and occupy properly the designated 
positions before dark? . . .
. . . I trust I need not say that I am always ready to move, 
and only delayed this morning because I understood yesterday that 
my movement depended on General Buell."
For Sherman's army, which had moved forward on the right as planned and 
engaged the enemy, Buell's timidity meant, as Halleck stated in a tele­
gram reprimanding Buell, embarrassing withdrawal: "Your not moving 
this morning, as agreed upon, has caused great embarrassment. General 
Thomas reports, that his left has no support from you, and I have been 
obliged to draw back General Sherman on the right." Beyond this dis­
concerting need for retreat were the lives sacrificed due to Buell's 
delay, a consideration that certainly did not escape Sherman, who
complained that the affair "cost us some pretty hard fighting and some
29lives and will cost more the next time.
In order to understand Buell's attitudes one must understand 
the philosophy of war which he and other generals supported. This 
involves recognition that the science-and-rules commanders shared a 
common temperament which formed the basis of their common military 
philosophy— a philosophy which, because it was not fully developed, 
helped to create the Union command problem.
The common temperament of the Buell-McClellan generals is 
characterized by their intellectually disciplined, methodical, scientific 
manner of thinking. Such men had a strong preference for and under­
standing of organization. This common temperament is easily observed 
by comparing the West Point experience of some of the notable members
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of this group, Halleck, Buell, McClellan, Meade, and Rosecrans, with 
three of their future opposites in Union command, Grant, Sherman, and 
Sheridan.
West Point in the 1840's was a world that, as Stephen B. Ambrose
states, "was designed to stifle all imagination," and that, according to
Senator John Sherman, produced impractical graduates, who were only
fitted "to discipline, to mold, to form lines and squares, to go through
30the ordinary discipline and routine of a camp." It was ideal for men 
with systematic ways of thought. Buell, for example, was remembered as 
"studious by habit, and commanded the confidence and respect of all who
O I
knew him,"JJ' Meade, who before West Point had attended the West Point- 
structured American Classical and Military Lyceum, was "naturally
O Ostudious and found no difficulty in maintaining his studies." Halleck 
and McClellan graduated high in their classes, both in scholarly achieve­
ment and conduct. And the speculation by students concerning Rosecrans
was that he was "good at everything, his studies, his military duties,
33his deportment"; he was classified as the "brilliant Rosy Rosecrans."
In contrast, West Point was anything but agreeable for the North's three 
most prominent Civil War generals, Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan. Grant 
later recalled his cadet days and admitted "I did not take hold of my 
studies with avidity, in fact I rarely ever read over a lesson the
Q /
second time during my entire cadetship." Sherman frankly stated that 
he "was not considered a good soldier, I was not a Sunday school 
cadet." And Philip Sheridan had anything but an easy time at West 
Point, graduating thirty-fourth in a class of fifty-three, and being 
continually threatened with dismissal for his conduct: "in every one 
of his cadet years Sheridan came close to being expelled for demerits,
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most of them collected for fighting. . . .  At graduation he was within 
five demerits of expulsion.
After West Point, Buell, McClellan, Meade, Halleck, and 
Rosecrans branched out into careers that favored their common inclina­
tion towards discipline, rules, science, and organization. Meade 
surveyed river basins and railroad routes as an engineer in the Topo- 
graphical Corps of the Army. McClellan was first an instructor at 
West Point, later an American observer in the Crimean War, and still
later an engineer and then vice-president of the Illinois Central 
38Railroad. Buell was an assistant to the Adjutant General for thirteen 
39years. Halleck was briefly an instructor at West Point, a recognized 
authority in military science, an author of a book on tactics, Secretary 
of State to the Military Governor of California, and a highly successful 
lawyer, belonging to a firm that was "one of the most respected and 
wealthy in California. William Rosecrans was a professor of engineer­
ing at West Point, worked ten years in the Army Corps of Engineers, and, 
after becoming a civilian, organized the Preston Coal Oil Company in
Cincinnati, and became a successful pioneer in the refining of 
41petroleum. In contrast, Sherman, Grant, and Sheridan lived a less 
elite existence. All three were officers in the infantry, which was 
the last choice of service for most cadets. Grant eventually resigned
/ Othe service to become a second-rate farmer and storekeeper. Sherman, 
after the army, wandered from job to job, being at various times an 
investor, banker, farmer, and finally the commandant of a Louisiana
/ *3military school just before the Civil War broke out. After West Point 
Sheridan was sent to the far west, where his zeal for fighting was 
countered by isolation and hostile Indians.^
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The first months of the Civil War placed a premium on the 
temperament associated with Buell, McClellan, and similarly oriented 
generals. Although the period was confusing to the rest of society, it 
was congenial to methodical minds. They were then at their best, for 
their success was not based on victorious clashes with the enemy but 
instead on administrative ability, the managerial thinking they knew so 
well. The enemy was truly a secondary problem until an army could be 
raised and organized.
Buell's early days as commander of the Army of the Ohio offers 
an example of this sort of success during the early stage of the war.
When he accepted this command in November, 1861, the North was still in 
turmoil. The Lincoln Administration was in a whirlwind of confusion; 
Secretary of War Simon Cameron was wringing his hands over deficiencies 
in supply and military leadership (not necessarily in number, but 
increasingly in poor quality); and as head of the Treasury Department, 
Salmon P. Chase was equally in the dark, "operating with untested 
assistants to meet uncertain demands from uncertain resources.
But administrative confusion was not the only sign of Northern 
inexperience in this early stage of the war, for most people did not 
comprehend the realities of warfare itself. It is true that Bull Run 
dissolved much of the romanticism that was associated with war; it was 
then recognized as more than cheering crowds, new uniforms, and exciting 
charges in which the enemy quickly turned and ran. But the North still 
had not experienced extensive casualties. A tinge of romantic illusion 
still survived, reflected in sham battles, graphic newspaper descriptions, 
and bombastic battle reports that people actually believed— the most
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obvious being McClellan's Rich Mountain Proclamation, which earned him
A C
the position of Commanding General of the Northern Armies.
Buell, with his systematic temperament, was at ease in this 
naive and disorganized world of the North. He quickly provided the 
organizational talent that was so desperately needed, and at the same 
time he correctly turned away from the small, sporadic threats offered 
by an equally disorganized enemy. This adaptability was specifically 
illustrated by the strong contrast he offered to generals around him 
and to his predecessors. Arriving in the west in 1861, Buell was 
immediately faced with administrative problems such as a lack of supplies, 
undisciplined officers and men, the political influence of governors, and 
the<like, that had plagued Fremont in Missouri and Sherman in Kentucky 
before him. They were problems that at times seemed ready to claim 
another victim in Buell's next door neighbor in Missouri, Iialleck, who 
in his first days of command wrote in a despairing note to Lincoln that 
he was "in the condition of a carpenter who is required to build a 
bridge with a dull axe, a broken saw, and rotten t i m b e r . B u e l l  
quickly took hold under such chaotic conditions. His first orders estab­
lished a long list of rules that centralized authority under his command:
. . . return of troops were to be made on the 10th and 20th of each 
month; no women were to be allowed in camp; all official correspon­
dence was to pass through proper channels (intermediate commanders 
to chief of staff), all volunteer officers were to be examined before 
a military board in order to determine their qualification to command; 
officers were to report by letter to headquarters, stating the duty 
they were engaged, and by whose orders. . . . ^8
Along with his authority, Buell also displayed a noticeable 
confidence in dealing with the specific problems of building a new army 
and department. While his neighbor Halleck was complaining about 
mutinous German troops^ Buell, with a similar problem, wrote with quiet
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assurance that "this condition of things, I feel assured, is changing.
I have found it necessary to make some summary examples, and have 
instituted courts-martial and board of examination. . . .
The great demand placed on the insufficient supply of regular 
officers meant steady complaints from local commanders. Halleck, 
echoing Sherman, claimed that "some of the brigadier-generals assigned 
to this department are entirely ignorant of their duties and unfit for 
any command."^ -*- Buell offered authorities in Washington a plan; it was 
an obvious plan, calling for authorization to "appoint, subject to 
confirmation," officers under his command, "dropping those who do not
tr o
turn out well." In short, instead of complaining, Buell proposed to 
rotate officers under his personal observance continually until positions 
were filled by competent men.
The overbearing influence of state governors was another common 
problem that commanders had to face in the early days of the war. In 
one of his first letters to McClellan in Washington, Buell wrote that 
"the Governor [David Tod of Ohio] evidently looks upon all Ohio troops 
as his army. He requires, I am told, morning reports from them, and 
their quartermasters to forward their returns to him." In the same 
letter he reported that an Ohio regiment had "been diverted by our 
officious Governor to Galipolis, where its colonel is telegraphing 
mysteriously to unauthorized persons for cavalry for his ’expedition 
to J."' This problem, as others, Buell simply took in stride. "I stop 
these things when they come to my knowledge," he wrote, "and after
C Oawhile will be able to correct them entirely."
But confidence and ability in administration and organization 
were not the only attributes that Buell displayed in the early months
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of the war. He also possessed an uncommonly cool attitude toward and
accurate estimate of the enemy. Unlike Sherman, his predecessor, Buell
never considered the enemy a major threat, but only the insignificant
54hinderance that he actually was. An attack by Confederates near 
Bacon Creek, Kentucky, brought forth the somewhat indifferent response 
that "we are beginning to be a little animated, The other night a 
party of the enemy came within some 10 miles of us and burned a small 
bridge over Bacon Creek, which will be repaired in three or four days."55 
One week later, an attack on the Union force at Munfordsville (8 Union,
33 Confederate killed), produced the flippant remark that the affair 
was " . . .  really one of the handsomest things of the season. Our 
neighbors in part begin to show signs of being interested. They are
destroying the railroads and receiving some reinforcements; not, I
5 6think, to any great amount yet." The various skirmishes common in
this early stage of the war were treated with a contemptuous air. Buell
even welcomed them: "We are now 'lying around somewhat loose,' and I
shall not care much if some of our fragments have to look sharply after
themselves. Major concentrations of the enemy also did not bother
Buell. Although Sherman had found Buckner's and Johnston's force at
5 8Bowling Green an unbearable nightmare, Buell complacently remarked 
that:
I do not place high estimate on Buckner's force at Bowling Green, 
and have no such thought as that he will attempt to advance. His 
position is purely defensive, and he will be quite content if he 
can maintain that. . . .  As for his attacking, though I do not 
intend to be unprepared for him, yet I should almost as soon see 
the Army of the Potomac marching up the road.59
The ability to discern enemy intentions was not due to any
natural genius that allowed Buell to stand back and see what others
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could not. Instead, it was directly related to his scientific ability,
interest, and temperament, combined with the need for organization in
his department. The enemy was only another inconvenience in Buell's
concentration on organization and administration. Excessive interest
in organization coupled with minimal interest in the enemy, which is the
hallmark of this type of Union general, is exemplified in Buell's letter
to General George B. McClellan explaining his concern over Confederate
General Zollicoffer's invasion of Eastern Kentucky with six thousand men:
I do not mean to be diverted more than is absolutely necessary from 
what I regard as of the first importance— the organization of my 
forces, now little better than a mob. I could fritter ghe whole of 
it away in a month by pursuing these roving bear bugs.
The preparatory stage of the war was of course temporary. The 
administrative confusion that was at first a primary consideration 
became in time secondary, being overcome by a combination of Northern 
industriousness, a more experienced President, and the increased 
military threat posed by the South. With better organization, fighting 
the enemy became the major concern, for war entered a new, horrid phase, 
in which the occasional skirmish was replaced by devastating Shilohs. 
Armies were no longer scattered bands of inept and inexperienced men.
They were now well trained and supplied, large and concentrated, and 
able to produce maximum slaughter.
But this change did not affect generals like Buell, for the 
perception of war that was appropriate in the preparatory stage, which 
emphasized organization and administration instead of fighting, developed 
into their permanent philosophy. In the minds of such commanders, war 
was a systemized science of rules that acted as a wall of defense 
against the increased power of the enemy, a creed which sharply con­
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trasted with the flexibility that had been outlined in the writings of 
Jomini and Saxe.
This strict adherence to the creed of science and rules meant 
that there was a group of Union generals who tried to make war proper, 
orderly, and— most of all— safe. In doing so, they offered efficiency 
on one hand. Yet, on the other hand, they failed to understand the art 
and risk of war and were temperamentally unable to deal with or accept 
the unpredictable intangibles of war.
This lopsided combination of efficiency (science) without risk 
created the image of indecisive mediocrity in these generals which the 
North knew so well, and which represented half of the Union command 
problem represented in the Buell Commission. An efficiently waged war 
meant a calculated war, a slow war, and a bloodless war, in which every 
move was pondered, and consideration was given primarily to logistics, 
administration, and contingencies that left little to chance. But 
scientific efficiency alone was not enough, for the risk, the unpre­
dictability, and the natural art of war always remained. Clausewitz 
referred to these latter items as "war proper";
Who would include in the conduct of war proper the whole catalogue 
of things like subsistence and administration? These things, it is 
true, stand in a constant reciprocal relation to the use of troops, 
but they are something essentially different from it. We have, 
therefore, the right to exclude them as well as other preparatory 
activities from the art of war in its restricted sense— from the 
conduct of war properly so called.^1
Generals like Buell simply did not have a proper appreciation of "war
proper." When it was necessary to face risk, such Union generals did
not seek ways to meet the unpredictability of combat but instead sought
means to avoid the risk of war. Science became an end in itself, a
permanent line of defense against combat and bloody war and an illusion
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that war could be made scientifically safe. In short, while Jomini and 
Saxe used science and flexibility to move toward the enemy more 
efficiently and to engage in combat ("war proper"), this group of Union 
generals, when faced with inevitable combat and risk, used their 
standards of efficiency as excuses for not fighting. This transforma­
tion largely explains why such a commander was never able to gain great 
success. During the Second Battle of Manassas, for example, 
efficient attentiveness to detail and administration became George B. 
McClellan's justification for not moving troops (incurring risk) until 
"properly" supplied. While Union authorities were realistically con­
cerned about forthcoming disaster for John Pope and his army, McClellan 
refused to send aid, claiming the two corps ordered to be sent were not 
completely equipped: "Franklin's artillery has no horses except for 
four guns with caissons. I can pick up no cavalry." Even Halleclc sent 
an urgent telegram to forget details and move toward Manassas, pointing 
out that the needed troops "must go tomorrow morning ready or not. If 
we delay too long there will be no necessity to go at all." But this 
failed to convince the administrative McClellan, who never did send 
troops in time, and who had to ask in response, "do you wish Franklin's 
corps to continue? He is without reserve ammunition and without trans­
portation.
Meade offered a similar example of this administrative inclination 
immediately after Gettysburg. Instead of moving rapidly to pursue the 
defeated Confederate forces south before they crossed the Potomac, he 
became bogged down with supply problems that could have been overlooked 
in the urgency of the moment:
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A large portion of the men are barefooted. Shoes will arrive at 
Frederick to-day, and will be issued as soon as possible. The 
spirit of the army is high; the men are ready and willing to make 
every exertion to push forward. The very first moment I can get 
the different commands, the artillery and cavalry, properly sup­
plied and in hand, I will move forward."63
The desire of such generals to avoid bloodshed was highly 
commendable, but it often led to a world of conjecture that meant pre­
meditated defeatism and immobility. Meade's actions after Gettysburg 
are some of the best examples of this particular imaginative world, for 
in his dilatory pursuit of the defeated Lee he reflects the gamut of 
this conjecture and defeatism. Two days after Gettysburg Meade was 
already thinking of his possible defeat, but was still seriously 
considering battle:
If I can get the Army of the Potomac in hand in the Valley, and the 
enemy have not crossed the river, I shall give him battle, trusting, 
should misfortune overtake me, that a sufficient number of my force, 
in connection with what you have in Washington, would reach that 
place so as to render it secure.64
Two days closer to the enemy his defeatism was more pronounced and his 
willingness to consider battle diminished in proportion. "I expect to 
find the enemy in a small position," he wrote, "well covered with 
artillery, and I do not wish to imitate his example at Gettysburg, and 
assault a position where the chances were so greatly against success."^ 
Four days later, and eight days after Gettysburg, he was still consid­
ering an attack on Lee, but was desperately looking for an excuse not 
to. "it is my intention to attack them to-morrow," he informed his 
generals, "unless something intervenes to prevent it, for the reason 
that delay will strengthen the enemy and will not increase my force.
But Meade did not attack and Lee escaped south across the Potomac. The 
excuse had been found the next day in the opinions of his corps
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commanders.^  Five weeks after Gettysburg, Meade ended further pursuit. 
The reason, given in a statement to Lincoln, betrayed a defeated com­
mander who was not really defeated, for it was his attitude and not the 
fortunes of battle that slowed him down and now stopped him completely:
I do not deem it necessary to discuss the contingencies of a 
failure, as they will, of course, present themselves to your mind. 
The whole question, however, in my judgment, hangs upon the ad­
vantages to be gained and the course to be pursued in the event of 
success. . . .  In fine, I can get a battle out of Lee under very 
disadvantageous circumstances, which may render his inferior force 
my superior, and which is not likely to result in any very decided 
advantage, even in case I should be victorious.
In this view I am reluctant to run the risks involved without 
the positive sanction of the Government.68
On other occasions the science-and-rules oriented Union generals
were perfectly willing to move toward the enemy, but only if risk could
be eliminated by ideal conditions and an absolute assurance of success.
This unreal attitude is reflected in McClellan's explanation for his
refusal to attack Lee the day after Antietam, thus allowing Lee to slip
quietly across the Potomac. "I should have had a narrow view of the
condition of the country," he explained, "had I been willing to hazard
69another battle with less than an absolute assurance of success." The 
same attitude was found during the Peninsular Campaign in McClellan's 
statement to his wife that Yorktown would be attacked, but slowly, after 
the possibility of failure was eliminated: "I can't tell you when 
Yorktown is to be attacked. . . .  It shall be attacked the first moment 
I can do it successfully. But I don't intend to hurry it; I cannot 
afford to fail."*7^  This sort of timid hesitation is perhaps best under­
lined by Rosecrans as he explained his long sojourn in Nashville, an 
explanation that argued for perfect safety in war:
Any attempt to advance sooner would have increased our difficulty 
both in front and rear. In front, because of greater obstacles,
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enemies in greater force, and fighting with better chances of 
escaping pursuit, if overthrown in battle. In rear, because of 
insufficiency and uncertainty of supplies, both of subsistance and 
ammunition, and no security of any kind to fall back upon in case 
of disaster.71
Such an attitude also caused the besieged Rosecrans to refuse to do 
anything against Bragg at Chattanooga, even though he developed a good 
plan of operation that surprised Grant only because it was not carried 
out.72
The common distaste for risk which these generals illustrated 
also meant that they would be more likely than other generals to follow 
a conciliatory policy toward enemy civilians under their control. War 
could be kept clean by keeping civilians out, and if one did not 
antagonize civilians one would also be protecting one’s army from the 
wrath of the rebel countryside. The conciliatory policy, however, was 
not always practical. Thus Meade was upset by the need to dirty war by 
taking rebel property: "It made me sad to do such injury, and I was 
really ashamed of our cause, which thus required war to be made on 
individuals." In a parallel incident, during his march to Chattanooga 
Buell was concerned about payment to the rebel citizenry for the little 
inconveniences expected in war: "There are cases where fences have been 
used as fuel, and fields destroyed by grazing animals."7  ^ Elsewhere 
he even ordered his subordinates to have estimates made "of the amount 
of damage done to the property of the persons on whose plantations your 
camps are established, and that you have payment made for all the 
property, such as wood, rails used for fuel, standing crops, from which 
our troops have derived benefit."7"’ This tender consideration was 
expressed while he was marching through a naturally desolate countryside, 
infested with guerrilla forces recruited largely from the locality, and
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with an army that was in a very real position to "starve unless there
is more activity and success in throwing forward s u p p l i e s . T h i s
was also a time in which Buell's own need of horses was desperate,^ yet
he was still reluctant to take them from rebel citizens. "in taking
horses," he cautioned, "it must be done in such a way that orderly
persons shall not be deprived of what may be necessary for their 
7 8ordinary work."
This distaste for risk also extended to politics, for the
political pressures of the day upset this type of Union general's
efficient, safe world. Almost as if facing enemy armies, these generals
displayed a haughty contempt for the politician. Examples are plentiful:
it becomes evident in Buell's refusal, in late February, 1862, to upset
his plan to move towards Nashville instead of East Tennessee despite
tremendous urging from Washington. "You have no idea of the pressure
brought to bear here upon the Government for a forward movement,"
McClellan informed Buell, "it is so strong that it seems absolutely
necessary to make the advance on Eastern Tennessee at once. . . .  It
is no time now to stand on trifles."^ Buell even refused to listen to
Lincoln's personal plea for movement into East Tennessee, although the
President indicated his distress "that our friends in East Tennessee
are being hanged and driven to despair, and even now I fear are thinking
of taking rebel arms for the sake of personal protection. . . .  I do
not intend this to be an order in any sense, but merely as intimated
before, to show you the grounds of my anxiety." Rosecrans' similar
contempt for the politician is most readily found in his retort that
he would not move until he was ready, when requested by Washington to
move from his position at Stone's River in December of 1863. 81 However,
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the best example of distaste for politicians by a general who would not
dare is McClellan’s insubordinate telegram to Lincoln during the
Peninsular Campaign, in which he told his Commander-in-Chief that "if I
save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you or
to any other persons in Washington. You have done your best to
82sacrifice this army."
The rule-oriented general was thus half of the Union command 
problem, to be demonstrated more fully below in the microcosmic arena 
of the Buell Military Commission. He was a general who offered only a 
picture of indecisiveness because of a personal temperament that leaned 
towards organization and rules and failed to consider the balanced 
talents needed in a commander as reflected in the writings of Jomini 
and Saxe. He was a commander who was not able to reflect both the 
natural art and science of war while maintaining flexibility in both.
He was a commander who could only consider a strict science of war.
This meant that the Buells and McClellans would be efficient, organized, 
and well prepared for battle but nothing more, for this was all there 
was to war. "War proper," as Clausewitz expressed it, was distasteful 
and to be avoided. In the Buell Commission this philosophy is found in 
a setting that seems to make it a little clearer.
The Buell Commission also served as a stage for the other half 
of the Union command problem. If the defense represented the science- 
and—rules school of generalship, the prosecution represented the oppo­
site world of art-and-risk as typified by the careers of generals Grant, 
Sherman, Sheridan, and Pope. The latter were generals who eventually 
enjoyed greater public confidence than rule-oriented leaders like Buell 
and McClellan. Like their counterparts, however, the art-and-risk
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generals were not complete, for in their own way they also reflected an 
imperfect understanding of war and of the ideas of men like Jomini and 
Saxe.
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CHAPTER III
THE GRANTS AND THE SHERMANS:
THE ART AND RISK OF WARFARE
For the people of the North, the archetypal Grant-Sherman
general represented the replacement of the mediocre Buell-McClellan
generals who had been prominent in the first half of the war. More
specifically, they were a sign of the times, representing the North’s
conversion to a philosophy of total war by late 1862 and early 1863.
This national conversion became apparent in Union command as John 
1 2Pope, Grant, and Halleck, the successful generals of 1862, were 
placed in control of Union armies. Such changes gradually included 
Sherman, Sheridan, and others of the type.
Evolution of civilian ideas about total war represented the 
preliminary change that eventually led to the promotion of these 
generals. In Lincoln, the evolution to a philosophy of total war may 
be seen in the difference between his earlier conservative attitude 
toward slavery ("I have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere 
with the institution of slavery in the States where it exists. I 
believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination to
n
do so"), and the new attitude that Lincoln showed in late September 
1862, after Antietam, Perryville, and the Peninsular and Chattanooga 
campaigns. The slave, as he then told Secretary of the Navy Gideon 
Welles, had become "a military necessity absolutely essential for the
57
58
salvation of the U n i o n , a  necessity that would make emancipation 
inevitable.
To Edwin Stanton, the new Secretary of War in 1862, total war 
meant going beyond the old Buell-McClellan cautious need for science and 
rules. Instead, he explained, war was to be vigorous, less traditional, 
and dependent upon such intrinsic qualities as fortitude, courage, and 
spirit:
Much has recently been said about military combinations and organ­
izing victory. I hear such phrases with apprehension. . , . Who 
can organize victory? Who can combine the elements of success on 
the battlefields? We owe our victories to the spirit of the Lord, 
that moved our soldiers to rush into battle, and filled the hearts 
of our enemy with terror and dismay. Patriotic spirit, with 
resolute courage in officers and men, is a military combination 
that never failed. We may well rejoice at the recent victories for 
'they teach us that battles are to be won now and by us in the same 
and only manner that they were ever won by any people or in any age 
since the days of Joshua, by boldly pursuing and striking the foe. 
What, under the blessing of providence I conceive to be the true 
organization of victory and military combination to end this war 
was declared in a few words by General Grant’ message to General 
Buckner "I propose to move immediately upon your works."5
In Congress, the idea of total war served as a stimulant for 
colorful radicals such as Zachariah Chandler, who had earlier defied 
the Washington Peace Conference of 1861 by asserting that "without a 
little bloodletting this Union would not be worth a rush."^ Commenting 
on the slowness of the Union Army in the Fall of 1861, he also wrote 
that "if we fail in getting a battle here now all is lost, and up to 
this time a fight is scarcely contemplated. Washington is safe . . . 
therefore let the country go to the d e v i l . T h i s  ideological tonic 
also applied to such frustrated moderates as John A. Gurley, who stated 
before the House on January 29, 1862:
What means this long delay in attacking the rebellious forces? 
Sir, our army has long been anxious to fight, our soldiers burn 
with, desire to strike at the traitors, our subordinate officers
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are chafing and panting for the battlefield. Why not fight? What 
lion is this that stands in the way? Far better is it to meet with 
occasional reverses and defeats than to remain in the inglorious 
and passive condition of the past. . . . The War has reached a 
point where Icid gloves, pleasant words and gilded promises are of 
no further use.®
Total war, such as that allegedly waged by Grant at Fort Henry and Fort 
Donelson, and by the victorious John Pope at New Madrid and Island No.
10, fit in well with the new outlook towards war in Congress. The new 
viewpoint seemed to he gaining adherents about the time of Thaddeus 
Steven's famous outburst against the South: "If their whole country 
must be laid waste, and made a desert, in order to save this Union from 
destruction, so let it be . . . I do not say it is time to resort to
Qsuch means; but I never fear to express my sentiments." For the time
being this sentiment seemed to culminate in the Second Confiscation Act,
an act that signified an attempt, as Senator Diven pointed out, to go
beyond war's own laws by fighting the enemy with civil enactment.^
For many common citizens of the North this transition to total
war meant hardened resolution towards war. One example may be found in
the words of one Henry Aten, relating to a trip he made with his friends
in 1862 for the purpose of enlisting in the army:
They had met men returning from the great battles of the previous 
year, wounded and maimed for life. The pride and pomp and circum­
stance of glorious war had disappeared, and all knew that war meant 
not only wounds and death, but hunger, hardship and privation. The 
people fully appreciated the gravity of the situation.H
On a more general level, this same personal resolve produced a
widespread response to Lincoln's call for volunteers in the Fall of 1862,
a call that established a new enthusiasm towards the war and that was
more credible than the sunshine patriotism of early recruitment. Illinois
contributed 58,689 volunteers at this call, second only to New York, a
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feat that was noted by the Provost Marshal at the end of the war as the 
greatest single example of volunteering during the conflict. The 
summons also brought a "well done Indiana" from Stanton to the Hoosier 
State; the Indianapolis Journal underlined the impressive fact that 
"4,000 men have been organized and sent to the field in four days,"-*-^  
This recruiting surge was not only found in Illinois and Indiana, for 
the Middle West contributed two-fifths of the 509,053 men enlisted under 
the call.^
This new total war philosophy in the North; the harsher policies 
of Lincoln and Congress; the hardened outlook and determination recog­
nizable in the common citizen; and the bold, spirited warfare intro­
duced by Stanton, were all part of a new way of looking at war that 
also expressed a need for another type of general, a need that men like 
Grant, Sherman, and the temporarily successful John Pope, could fill:
A new man has risen on the Potomac, and he was waging war, not 
scientific starchy, gilded war, but enterprising dashing, fearful 
war— he did not stop to dig and build fortifications but pushed 
ahead. Pope is always ready for a fight. If the enemy prove too 
strong for him he will give and fall back, and if there is an 
opening for him ahead, he will pop into it.-*-5
On the field of battle, however, these new generals created 
conflicting impressions. On one hand they were the type of general 
expected by Northern society, for they did not share the lack of 
imagination of their predecessors. On the other hand, their concept of 
war still left much to be desired, if the ideal commander specified by 
Jomini and Saxe had any validity. These commanders had their flaws, and 
among them was a lack of balance between the art and science of war.
In that sense Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan were incomplete generals, 
despite their famous victories.
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The shortcomings of this type of general were not immediately 
apparent in comparison to the Buell or McClellan counterpart he re-*- 
placed, First, unlike this counterpart, he achieved important results—  
as Vicksburg, Chattanooga, Atlanta, and the Wilderness campaigns 
testify— that were beyond the administrative talents of Buell,
Rosecrans, or McClellan.
The different results were based on a temperament and a philoso­
phy of total war that was more spontaneous and innovative than that of 
the well-trained science—and-rules oriented generals. As briefly 
reflected by Grant's and Sherman's West Point recollections, these new 
generals were not intellectuals or textbook professionals such as Buell 
or McClellan. Instead, generals like Grant and Sherman displayed an 
attitude towards war that was remarkably simple and uncomplicated.
They accepted war as it really was, as it appeared on a day-by-day 
basis, instead of following a maze of rules for a perfect, safe, proper 
conflict. Unlike Buell, this new general understood and accepted the 
element of risk inherent in war, the part Clausewitz stated was action 
which "must be directed, to a certain extent, in a mere twilight, which 
in addition not unfrequently— like fog and moonlight— gives to things 
exaggerated size and grotesque appearance.Grant  recognized the 
unavoidable risk of war at Vicksburg, when he cut away from his supplies 
south of the city and accepted the danger of Confederate General Joseph 
E. Johnston's army, which operated in his rear. John Pope recognized 
this need for risk on the Rappahannock, when he grudgingly maintained 
an advanced, exposed position ("the line of the Rappahannock offers no 
advantage for defense, but you may rely upon our making a very hard 
fight in case the enemy advances upon us"), in order to stem the tide
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of Lee's invasion.^ Risk was also accepted by Sherman when he decided
to march, to the sea. Years after the war, he still contemplated the
uneasiness that was associated with this maneuver:
There was a "devil-may-care feeling" pervading officers and men, 
that made me feel that full load of responsibility, for success 
would be accepted as a matter of course, whereas, should we fail, 
this "march" would be adjudged the wild adventeur Isic] of a crazy 
fool.18
In accepting war on its own terms, these generals also under­
stood that war was bloody, not clean. They would have readily 
comprehended Sherman's statement to his superior, Halleck, during the 
Atlanta campaign when bloodshed was at a minimum, reminding him that 
this situation was unusual and that things would become livelier: "I 
think everything has progressed and is progressing as favorably as we 
could expect; but I know we must have one or more bloody battles such 
as have characterized Grant's terrific struggles."1  ^ What a contrast 
to Buell, who— during his first major movement to Bowling Green in 
December, 1861— maintained that "the object is not to fight great 
battles and storm impregnable fortifications, but by demonstrations and 
maneuvering to prevent the enemy from concentrating his scattered forces
o n
In doing this it must be expected there will be some fighting."zu
These generals' clear perceptions of military realities also 
allowed them to accept the politicians, whereas earlier Union commanders 
placed the politician only one step above the enemy. The political side 
of war for these Grant-Sherman generals was as real and important as the 
enemy. They saw the powerful role that politics plays in a peoples' war 
which is inherently based on the attitude and ideals of the common man. 
Grant saw politics as a major factor behind the Battle of Iuka, which
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was caused by Confederate General Sterling Price's possible move into,
and the North's concern for, Tennessee:
I was apprehensive lest the object of the rebels might be to get 
troops into Tennessee to reinforce Bragg. . . . The authorities 
at Washington, including the general-in-chief of the army, were 
very anxious, as I have said, about affairs both in East and West 
Tennessee; and my anxiety was quite as great on their account as 
for any danger threatening my command.21
Recognition of the political side of war also played a primary part in
Grant's movement towards Vicksburg. After disastrous raids on his
supplies, he decided not to retreat to Memphis to form a new line, but
to continue on, relying on the countryside for supplies, because of what
he described as "political exigencies":
Such a withdrawal as would have been necessary— say to Memphis, 
would have had all the effects in the North of a defeat. This was 
an ever present consideration with me; for, although I took no open 
part in politics, and was supposed to be as much of a Democrat as a 
Republican, I felt that the Union depended upon the administration, 
and the administration upon victory. , . . The move backward would 
further discourage the loyal North and make it difficult to get men 
or supplies. Already the elections had shown discouragement. I 
felt that what was wanted was a forward movement to a victory that 
would be decisive. In a popular war we had to consider political 
exigencies.22
This political common sense contrasts sharply with McClellan's famous 
outburst to Lincoln: "If I save the army now, I tell you plainly that 
I owe no thanks to you or to any other person in Washington. You have 
done your best to sacrifice this army."^
By the same token, these two types of Union general favored 
different policies towards rebel citizens. Unlike Buell, who string­
ently followed a traditional moral code in his protection of Confederate 
property, even though that meant suffering serious setbacks from 
Confederate partisans at the same time, generals like Grant or Sherman 
changed their policy toward the enemy as the situation c h a n g e d .2^ Grant,
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for example, showed a wide variation in his policy toward rebel
civilians. Before the Battle of Shiloh, with good enough supply lines
and little concern for the enemy, he protected the property "of the
citizens whose territory was invaded, without regard to their sentiments,
whether Union or Secession." Immediately after Shiloh and the recent
sting of battle, however, he decided "to consume everything that could
be used to support or supply armies."ZD Later, moving without a base of
supplies through the countryside of secessionist Mississippi, he
threatened the citizens with a promise to "desolate their country for
forty miles around" ' everywhere that guerrilla forces were found. The
willingness to abandon a conciliatory policy was more sudden in the
fiery tempered Philip Sheridan who, after finding an officer murdered
in the Shenandoah Valley, "in hot fury ordered every house, barn, and2 8outbuilding within five miles burned to the ground." John Pope also
displayed an often none-too-tender concern towards rebel civilians, the
most outstanding example being a proclamation to the people of northern
Virginia that promised indiscriminate punishment for everyone who
simply happened to live in the area of any guerrilla disturbances:
The people of the Valley of the Shenandoah, and throughout the 
regions of operations of this army, living along the lines of rail­
road and telegraph, and along the routes of travel in the rear of 
United States forces, are notified that they will be held respon­
sible for any injury done the track, line or road, or for any 
attacks upon trains or straggling soldiers, by bands of guerrillas 
in the neighborhood. y
Taken as a whole, the differences between the Grant-Sherman 
general and his Buell-McClellan counterpart, relative to seeing war 
from a realistic perspective, produced a vengeful, uninhibited, total 
war attitude on the field that brought results. While a commander like 
Buell operated on a level which found him taking the time to regulate
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work party time tables, and criticize officers' mistakes in filling out 
30forms, a general like Sherman kept his mind turned only towards the
enemy. Buell would never have written, as Sherman did during the
Atlanta campaign, "we intend to fight Joe Johnston until he is satisfied,
and I hope he will not attempt to escape. If he does, my bridges are
down, and we will be after him."31 Nor would Buell ever have told his
superior, as Sherman did before the Battle of Atlanta, that he was
tired of defensive war, that the offensive increased war twenty—five
p e r c e n t . A n d  McClellan gave speeches to his troops, reflective of
his greater interest in procedure and administration than action:
For a long time I have kept you inactive but not without a purpose. 
You were to be disciplined, armed and instructed, the formidable 
' artillery you now have had to be created. I have held you back so 
that you might give the death blow to the rebellion. These prelim­
inary results are now accomplished. The Army of the Potomac is now 
a real army, magnificent in material, admirable in discipline and 
instruction, and excellently equipped and armed.33
John Pope, on the other hand, gave speeches calling for action against
the enemy:
I have come to you from the west where we have always seen the 
backs of our enemy; from an army whose business has been to seek 
the adversary and to beat him when found; whose policy has been 
attack and not defense. I hear constantly of taking strong posi­
tions and holding them, of lines of retreat and losses of supply.
Let us discard such ideas. The strongest position a soldier can 
desire to occupy is one from which he can most easily advance 
against the enemy. Let us study the probable line of retreat of 
our opponents, and leave our own to take care of itself. Let us 
look before us and not behind. Success and glory are in the 
advance, while disaster and shame lurk in the rear.34
But the total war general, with his realistic perception of war 
and his great achievements, was still as lacking in his own way as the 
counterpart he replaced. The flaws become apparent when one returns 
to the flexibility and the military philosophy of Jomini and Saxe. For 
in the light of these two eighteenth-century generals' perception of
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war as a delicate balance of art and science, the new Union general 
still lacked balance. This was not because such a commander failed to 
understand the art of war, for Grant and Sherman, and others like them, 
would have been accepted by Jomini and Saxe as natural artists of war. 
Grant at Vicksburg, accepting the danger of Joe Johnston's army in his 
rear, or Sherman's acceptance of bloodshed during the Atlanta campaign 
and later of the risky march to the sea, reflected nicely what Jomini 
referred to as the inborn "special talent which is indispensable to the 
individual who has amidst the noise and confusion of battle, to keep a 
hundred thousand men cooperating toward the attainment of one single 
object," and "the special executive ability which distinguishes the 
practical man from the one who knows only what others teach.
The artistry and risk which Grant and Sherman illustrate, 
however, is in sharp contrast to their failure to recognize and under­
stand properly what we have called the science of war. Jomini and Saxe 
thought science was as important as natural art in a commander. This 
was the part of war that, as outlined in these eighteenth century 
theorists' numerous rules (eleven lines of battle, twelve orders of 
battle, distinction between objective point of maneuver and geographical 
objective), was to be a flexible tool aiding the commander's natural 
artistic understanding and acceptance of war's risk, bloodshed, and 
tribulations. The science of war was thus a means of preventing military 
conflict from degenerating into mass murder.
The failure of the total war general to recognize this science 
and to maintain a reasonable balance between art and science (to under­
stand and accept war's risk and bloodshed yet still try to regulate and 
prevent it), betrayed a paradox. Although such a general was a natural
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artist who accepted the reality of war with little hesitation, he was 
also a general who-— tending to disregard the regulatory process of 
science— of ten displayed indifference and apathy towards these realities. 
He then became the bloody insensitive fighter who understood realities 
(blood and risk) only in a superficial sense, to the point of disregard­
ing them— even no longer understanding them.
In the field such a general was ready to accept strategy and
tactics however bloody, if they promised the quick result. Barbara
Tuchman, referring to the philosophy of war reflected some forty-nine
years later in early World War I French generals, called this attitude
dlan, a romantic concept of war which meant, as explained in the French
Regulations of 1913, an impulsive war of momentum that considered only
the factors of spirit, feeling, morale, and will:
Battles are beyond everything else struggles of morale. Defeat is 
inevitable as soon as the hope of conquering ceases to exist.
Success comes not to him who has suffered the least, but to him 
whose will is firmest and morale strongest.36
The tendency to replace science with dlan may readily be per­
ceived in Grant. The first time he sent his troops into battle he 
clearly displayed Jomini's and Saxe's artistry in his reaction towards 
battle, bloodshed, and risk. "From that event to the close of the war," 
he wrote, "i never experienced trepidation upon confronting an enemy, 
though I always felt more or less anxiety. I never forgot that he had 
as much reason to fear my forces as I had his." However, immediately 
after this, his first battle of the war, Grant's understanding of risk 
and bloodshed seemed little more than indifference. Disregarding 
science for dlan, he decided to attack the precarious position at 
Belmont, heavily protected by a concentrated rebel force across the
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river at Columbus, Kentucky, for the simple reason that his men seemed 
to possess the dlan which made them want to fight:
I had no orders which contemplated an attack by the National 
troops, nor did I intend anything of the kind when I started from 
Cairo; but after we started I saw that officers and men were elated 
at the prospect of at last having the opportunity of doing what 
they had volunteered to do— fight the enemies of their country.38
At Vicksburg Grant was the natural artist of war who correctly 
and brilliantly understood, accepted, and challenged the reality of war. 
By night he ran his boats past the city's guns; he lived off the country 
instead of turning back when supplies were sparse; and he accepted the 
presence of Joseph E. Johnston's army at his rear. However, emerging 
before the city of Vicksburg, he seems to have been callous and indif­
ferent to reality. Overlooking the precautions of military science, 
he temporarily adopted the warfare of momentum (dlan) and accordingly 
ordered one attack and then another on a Confederate entrenchment that
onSherman declared was more difficult than Sevastopol. v Grant ordered 
the slaughter because he thought it was necessary to maintain the morale 
of the men: ''The troops themselves were impatient to possess Vicksburg, 
and would not have worked in the trenches with the same zeal, believing 
it unnecessary, that they did after their failure to carry the enemy's 
works."40
Grant is only one example of how Northern total war generals 
understood and accepted the savage facts of war to the point of being 
desensitized to the bloody results. For John Pope this paradox was 
nicely reflected in his most trying experience of the war, the Battle 
of Second Manassas. His uninhibited acceptance of the risk of war is 
illustrated by his letter to Halleck, after retreating from the battle­
field in defeat. His comments are not excuses, nor do they blame the
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government, as was typical with a general like McClellan. Instead, they 
combine unhappy facts with sporadic assurances that everything would turn 
out for the best. "Both horses and men have been two days without food," 
he informed his superior,
and the enemy greatly outnumber us. . . .  Do not be uneasy. We 
will hold our own here. The labors and hardships of this army for 
two or three weeks have been beyond description. We have delayed 
the enemy as long as possible without losing the army. We have 
damaged him heavily. . . .  Be easy; everything will go well.^l
Yet, as with Grant, Pope’s understanding and acceptance of war's hard­
ships developed at times to the point of indifference to science.
Warfare became only a question of spirit, morale, and momentum. For 
Pope this dlan was found in his decision, oblivious to bloodshed or risk, 
to attack a force that was "so greatly superior in number . . . that, 
whilst overpowering us on our own left, he was able to assault us also 
with very superior forces on our right. . . . Every movement of delay 
increased the odds against us, and I therefore advanced to the attack 
as rapidly as I was able to bring my forces into action." Elan was 
also reflected in Pope's romantic, impulsive last stand mentality prior 
to his retreat before Lee: "Our troops are all here in position, 
though much used up and worn out . . . but you may rely on our giving 
them as desperate a fight as I can force our men to stand up to. . . .
a 3
I shall fight as long as a man will stand up to the work."
Sherman probably offers one of the best examples of the total 
war generals' tendency to disregard science for dlan. Reporting to 
Halleck after directly attacking Joe Johnston's position on Kenesaw 
Mountain, a position he had previously described as "one vast fort 
. . . fully fifty miles of connected trenches, with abatis and finished
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A Abatteries, Sherman showed that like Grant and Pope he was prone to
disregard science for spirit, momentum, and morale;
I perceived that the enemy and our officers had settled down into 
a conviction that I would not assault fortified lines. All looked 
to me to outflank.
An army to be efficient must not settle down to a single mode 
of offense, but must be prepared to execute any plan which promises 
success. I wanted, therefore, for the moral effect to make a suc­
cessful assault against the enemy behind his breastworks.45
The immediate result of this type of warfare, which placed 
energy and spirit Cart) above rules and theories (science), was the 
long casualty lists of the Union armies. Sherman hinted at this art- 
versus-science discrepancy and its results at the very end of his 
Kenesaw Mountain letter to Halleck:
iOn the 27th of June the two assaults were made . . . and both 
failed, costing us many valuable lives, among them those of Generals 
Harker and McCook, Colonel Rice and others badly wounded, our aggre­
gate loss being nearly 3,000, while we inflicted comparatively 
little loss to the enemy, who lay behind his well-formed breast­
works . 46
The discrepancy and high casualty count was more graphically reflected 
in Grant’s strategy at Cold Harbor. Here was a battle which presents 
the picture of troops being pushed forward to break the Confederate 
line and end the war with dlan, with spirit, with energy, without first 
being given the benefit of the reconnaissance of a rebel position that 
Catton described as
. . .  no simple line of breastworks that the army was going to 
attack in the morning. From the Chickahominy swamps all the way 
to the Totopotomoy, the Confederate line on the morning of June 3 
was cunningly and elaborately designed to take advantage of every 
ravine, knoll, and hillock, every bog and water course, every 
clump of trees and patch of brambles, so that unending cross fires 
could be laid on all possible avenues of approach. . . . There 
was hardly a spot on the front which could not be hit by rifle fire 
and artillery from dead ahead and from both sides.4?
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This disregard for the normal precautions dictated by the science of 
war resulted in 5,617 Union casualties, in a battle in which "the actual 
advance was not more than eight minutes"’— and for the entire five-week 
campaign Grant lost 52,789 (killed, wounded, and missing).'^®
The tendency of the North’s total war general to ignore Jomini’s 
and Saxe's prescription for flexible rules to prevent high casualties 
is only part of this type of Union generals' overall portrait. This 
flaw, taken together with the benefits of his special talent to under­
stand and accept war's risk ("poetry and metaphysics"),^ produced a 
creditable, yet incomplete general. He satisfied the North's conversion 
to a philosophy of total war; he acted the part of the uninhibited, 
citizen general; his philosophy kept the war moving; he was not afraid 
of the enemy; and, most important, he produced victories. These results, 
however, reflected low efficiency, and were unnecessarily bloody because 
of a disregard of science in war.
At best the total war generals were only partial successes; 
although they may have been more successful than their Buell-McClellan 
counterparts, the two groups are more complementary than contrasting. 
While one type of general was characterized by a temperament which 
accepted only the science of war, the other was characterized by a 
temperament and talent for understanding only the art of war. Generally 
speaking, the defense in the Buell Commission reflected the former 
viewpoint. The latter attitude illustrated the prosecution.
Thus the stage was set for the clash of views which epitomized 
the differences in strategic ideas found throughout the Union Army.
The commission itself marks a turning point. After it met, though not 
necessarily because of it, the bolder generals took increasingly
important roles in achieving the eventual Union victory. A perceptive 
observer, in November 1862, might well have discerned the shape of 
future events from the progress and outcome of the Buell Commission 
deliberations.
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CHAPTER IV
THE BUELL MILITARY COMMISSION AS A MICROCOSM 
OF THE UNION COMMAND PROBLEM
Years after the war, former Union Major General Lew Wallace 
wrote in his autobiography that when he was ordered to preside over the 
Buell Military Commission in 1862, he considered it a privilege that 
was "only a little less acceptable than field duty." Field duty at the 
time was something Wallace wanted very badly. After the Battle of 
Shiloh, two months before, and his controversial failure to reinforce 
Grant during the first day of fighting, his military career seemed to 
be degenerating into a series of menial tasks devised by what he called 
"my bad angel at headquarters," referring to his commander, Henry 
Halleck, After finishing the petty duty of organizing paroled prisoners 
at Camp Chase, Missouri, for a trip to Minnesota to deal with the Sioux 
Indian outbreak, Wallace was so anxious to return to the real war that 
at the time he received his orders to head the Commission he was going 
behind his superior's back to see Grant: "possibly he might be prevailed 
upon to give me something to do," wrote Wallace, before Halleck could 
"devise an interference for me,"^
The high value Wallace placed on his new position as a member 
of the Buell Commission was a natural consequence of being a professional 
soldier and perpetual student of war. He recognized the court proceed­
ings to be an education in the conduct of war. One of the schoolmasters
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was Buell, an officer of the "Old Army," in the role of defendant, "a 
professor with daily lectures giving the movements of his army and the 
reasons for them." There was another educational advantage that supple­
mented the first one. As he considered the other witnesses, such as 
General George II. Thomas, whom he likened to a "majestic lion in repose," 
Wallace concluded that
. . . there was another factor scarcely less contributive— it was 
the number of men of military distinction called before us as 
witnesses. . . .
I cannot recall another commission or any military court 
assembled during the war honored with the presence of so many 
officers of distinction.
As president, he was also well aware of the fact that he was in perfect 
position to take advantage of this distinguished gathering, noting with 
delightful smugness that when he wanted the elaboration of a point for 
his own personal satisfaction "it would always be in my power to have 
things rendered explicitly."
Wallace's metaphor of the Buell Commission as a military school 
reflected the basic components that made its proceedings a microcosm of 
the Union command problem. What he quaintly referred to as "Old Army" 
represented the careful but ultra-conservative philosophy of war of the 
Buells and McClellans. This philosophy underlay Buell's defense. The 
observation that the court would hear an exceptional number of "officers 
of distinction" referred to the prosecution, consisting of a six-man 
board of officers and their witnesses who represented the Grant-Sherman 
type of Northern general. This prosecution advocated a vibrant, unin­
hibited, yet impetuous philosophy of warfare which promised results and 
victories— however inefficient and bloody they might be.
79
These two distinctive philosophical positions, representing 
the separate roles of prosecution and defense, did not alone make the 
proceedings a microcosm of the command problem; they only supplied the 
necessary ingredients. The structure of the court also has to be 
considered. In format it was classified by Secretary of War Stanton's
O
order as a "Military Commission," a term not found in either the 1846 
or 1861 editions of military laws and statutes published by the govern­
ment, which prescribed revisions to the Articles of War. The only two 
forms of military court recognized by these regulations were trial by 
court-martial and court of inquiry.^ The military commission was 
actually a special, unofficially recognized court, introduced by 
Lieutenant General Winfield Scott during the Mexican War to serve the 
vague purpose of supplementing military law.^ Specifically, it was 
concerned with the problem of military jurisdiction, in Mexico, over 
offenses committed by American troops against the civil population:
Many offenses, and some of them of the gravest character, may 
be committed by our troops and persons connected with the army, 
which are not by express provisions of law within the jurisdiction 
of any military tribunal. Such offenses, when committed within the 
limits of the United States, are referred to the federal or state 
courts, and the offenders are turned over to them for trial and 
punishment; but when perpetuated in the enemy's country, tempor­
arily in possession of our army, it is very doubtful whether there 
is now any mode of punishing the criminals. There may not be any 
civil tribunal to which the cases can be referred, and the military 
courts decline to take cognizance of them, under the belief that 
they have no legal right to do so. Without some authority to 
punish such crimes, great injury will necessarily result. . . .  I 
therefore recommend that court-martial, or some military tribunal 
to be organized by the general in command, should be invested, by 
express provisions of law, with authority to try offences committed 
beyond the limits of the United States, and within the district of 
country in the actual occupancy of our military forces, where there 
are no civil or criminal courts, or none but those of the enemy, to 
which the offenders can be delivered up for trial and p u n is h m e n t.6
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This original purpose of the commission was forgotten by the 
time of the Civil War. Instead of serving as a supplementary arm of 
military law to protect the civil population in enemy territory, it was 
a form of mock trial, used by the Government against an unpopular 
military commander for political intent. Yet it is this divergence from 
original form and purpose that is important here, for it reflects the 
value of the Buell Commission as a microcosm of the command problem.
The court-martial and court of inquiry were very formalized military 
structures under the Articles of War. Well-defined roles were required, 
including that of president, judge advocate, a certain number of members 
for the prosecution, defendent, and witnesses for the prosecution and 
defense.^ Each role had a specific purpose and rights defined under a 
maize of rules, The President of court-martial, for example, was 
officially listed in the Articles as "the organ of the court to keep 
order and conduct its business. He speaks and acts for the court in 
each case where the rule has been prescribed by law, regulation, or its
O
own resolution." The Judge Advocate was an objective prosecuter; he 
prosecuted for the government but at the same time was instructed to be 
counsel for the accused:
The Judge Advocate shall prosecute in the name of the United States, 
but shall so far consider himself as counsel for the prisoner, after 
the said prisoner shall have made his plea, as to object to any 
leading question to any of the witnesses, or any question to the 
prisoner, the answer to which might tend to incriminate himself.9
Both bodies were very structured, with a singular purpose, 
specific charges, and specific objectives. The court-martial, for 
example, was intended to deal with misconduct that usually involved two 
or three specific allegations to be proved or disproved. One Jacob P, 
Wilson, coming before a trial by court-martial, found himself faced
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with three charges relating to his conduct on a particular day during 
the Peninsular Campaign:
Charge I.-— Misbehavior before the enemy.
Specification.--— In this: That he, Jacob P. Wilson, a major in 
the Fifth Regiment of Pennsylvania 'Volunteer Cavalry, in the service 
of the United States, while on duty with his regiment at or near 
Williamsburg, "Va., did misbehave himself before the enemy, and did 
shamefully abandon his post and command and run away. This at or 
near said Williamsburg, and between Williamsburg and Yorktown, Va., 
on about the 9th day of September, 1862.
Charge II.— Speaking words inducing others to misbehave them­
selves before the enemy and to run away and to shamefully abandon 
the post which he or they were commanded to defend.
Specification.— In this: That he, said Jacob P. Wilson, major 
as aforesaid, being stationed with his regiment at or near said 
Williamburg, which post he and they were commanded to defend, did 
speak words inducing members of his regiment, or some of them, to 
i misbehave themselves before the enemy, to shamefully abandon said 
post, and to run away. This at or near Williamsburg on or about 
September 9, 1862,
Charge III .— Cowardice.
Specification.-— In this; That said Jacob P. Wilson, major as 
aforesaid, while stationed with his regiment at or near said 
Williamsburg, and before the enemy, did, in a cowardly manner, mis­
behave, abandon his post and command, and run away. This at or 
near Williamsburg, Va., on or about the 9th day of September, 1862.-^
Union General Fitz-John Porter faced trial by court-martial on 
only two specific charges relating to two orders that were allegedly 
disobeyed during a three day period: one order on the 27th of August, 
1862, at Warrenton Junction, Virginia, and another two days later during 
the Battle of Second Manassas. Concise specifications of these charges 
included quotations of telegrams from General Pope to Porter.^
Unlike a court-martial, a court of inquiry was not a trial.
Yet it was still a rigidly structured body with very apparent although 
not specific charges. According to the Articles, it was concerned with
ii . . the nature of any transaction, accusation, or imputation against
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12any officer or soldier." This purpose seems vague but, as typically
outlined in court orders, it meant the investigation of a specific
occurrence or incident that was of a questionable nature;
The court will investigate and report on the action and conduct 
of General Scully in the matter of one of the regiments (Thirty- 
fourth New York Volunteers) of his brigade refusing to do duty on 
or about the 1st of May, and express their opinion as to his 
conduct at that time.
Another order for a court of inquiry specified an investigation pertain­
ing to the evacuation of Saint John's Bluff:
At the request of Lieut. Col. C. F, Hopkins, late commander at 
Saint John's Bluff, a court of inquiry is hereby ordered, to con­
vene at this post at 10 a.m. on tomorrow, to take evidence of the 
facts relating to the evacuation of the post at Saint Join's Bluff, 
with its armament and stores.14
1 This type of court did not always have a defendent, although it 
usually did; but even then its purpose and investigation, as witnessed 
by an order concerning the failure of the Petersburg mine explosion, 
remained singular and concise;
By direction of the President, a Court of Inquiry will convene in 
front of Petersburg at 10 a.m. on the 5th instant, or as soon there 
after as practicable, to examine into and report upon the facts 
and circumstance attending the unsuccessful assault on the enemy's 
position on the 30th of July, 1864.15
Compared to these two officially recognized courts, the Buell 
Commission was only half as structured in format and purpose. It was 
not a military trial or court of inquiry but, as General Wallace stated 
during proceedings, something much less formal:
. . . it is not a court-martial or court of inquiry; but a 
court of investigation. To show the distinction: General Buell is 
not charged with any tiling before the court; there is no charge, no 
specification. It is simply an investigation of general operations 
which certain officers of the Army are charged to make.l^
To a degree, the court of investigation followed the basic 
format of the two courts under the Articles. It had a president, judge
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advocate, and a board of officers and witnesses. But these positions 
were only imitations of those found in the court-martial and court of 
inquiry. Since the court of investigation was an unofficial investi­
gative body, there were no specific charges, no officially recognized 
accused, and no precedents to follow. As a result, the president, 
instead of being the ''organ of the court," as under the court-martial, 
was a mere figurehead. The Judge Advocate's role was also considerably 
diminished from that prescribed under the Articles. Instead of being 
both a prosecutor and a counsel for the accused, he was actually neither, 
for there really was no one to prosecute, and no one to protect.
Beyond specific structure, the Buell Military Commission also 
bore only a faint similarity to the court-martial and court of inquiry 
in its objective. As a general investigative body, this objective 
tended to be much broader in scope than that found in either of the 
official courts under the Articles. Stanton's order convening the 
commission indicated a purpose that (although precise as far as naming 
Buell as the topic of investigation) was quite uncertain, for it 
included neither specific charges related to singular points of miscon­
duct as in a court-martial, nor the questionable event characterized by 
orders for courts of inquiry. Instead, the Buell Commission order was 
intended to direct the investigation toward questionable events over a 
span of time that covered the year or more of operations of the Army 
of the Ohio in Kentucky and Tennessee. "You will please organize," 
Stanton ordered,
a Military Commission to inquire into and report upon the operations 
of the forces under command of Major-General Buell in the States of 
Tennessee and Kentucky, and particularly in reference to General 
Buell suffering the State of Kentucky to be invaded by the rebel 
forces under General Bragg, and in his failure to relieve Munford-
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ville and suffering it to be captured; also in reference to the 
battle of Perryville and General Buell's conduct during that battle, 
and afterward suffering the rebel forces to escape from Kentucky 
without loss or capture; and also to inquire and report upon such 
other matters touching the military operations aforesaid as in the 
judgment of the Commission shall be beneficial to the service.
This last clause illustrates best both the open-ended nature of the
desired investigation and the extra-legal purposes for which it could
be used.
The broad investigative authority of the Buell Military 
Commission made it a potentially sinister tool in the hands of the 
government for appeasing politicians and public and for "convicting" a 
military officer. In its investigative form it was ideally suited to 
satisfy public clamor— especially from powerful politicians— for 
immediate court action against an unpopular military commander when 
there were no specific charges or basis for action. Extending from 
this purpose, it was also a court of investigation that probed the 
controversial actions of a commander that did not appear definite or 
serious enough to bring about charges, to see if charges could be made 
after all.
The formation of the Buell Commission was actually due to ani­
mosity directed towards Buell by two influential politicians: Oliver 
P. Morton, Governor of Indiana, and Andrew Johnson, Military Governor 
of Tennessee. Morton's feelings could be traced back to the early days 
of Buell's command, when the governor found the general to be an opponent 
who successfully limited his influence in military affairs, influence 
which Morton so covetously enjoyed in the early days of the war when the 
state governments were largely responsible for meeting the burdens of 
preparing the nation for conflict.-^
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Andrew Johnson's hatred of Buell was a little more complex. 
Braxton Bragg had been allowed to invade Johnson's home state of 
Tennessee, the capital of Nashville was threatened, and Buell had 
engaged in a steady backward movement away from the invading enemy 
toward Kentucky. There was also the matter of Buell's refusal to move 
into and liberate unionist East Tennessee, a refusal that continually 
gnawed at Johnson:
In my opinion Buell never intended to move into East Tennessee, 
notwithstanding his fair promises to the President and others that 
he would. He could have met Bragg and whipped him with the great­
est of ease. . . .  It seems to me General Buell fears his own 
personal safety and has concluded to gather the whole army at this 
point as sort of a body guard to protect him instead of East 
Tennessians. General Buell is very popular with the rebels, and 
impression is that he is more partial to them than to Union men. 
r May God save the country from some of the generals who have been 
conducting this war.19
Both politicians had been instrumental in having Buell relieved 
of command. Both had sent numerous letters to Washington asking for 
his removal and had even made a special trip to see Lincoln personally
O Aconcerning the matter. Their influence in the formation of the Buell 
Commission was nicely summarized by Major Donn Piatt, the Judge 
Advocate, who related his experiences in obtaining the order for the 
proceedings:
Those fierce War Governors, 0. P. Morton and Andrew Johnson, had 
stuffed the ears of Secretary Stanton with stories of Buell's in­
competence and disloyalty. He was a traitor, they charged, and 
claimed to have conclusive proof of his treachery. I did my best 
to get charges and specifications from the War Department on which 
to base my investigations, but was met with an order to report to 
Messrs. Morton and Johnson for them. I did so, and got from these 
gentlemen assurances of proof, and earnest requests to proceed.
The proofs were never produced.21
In forming a court that probably would not have been formed but 
for the need to fulfill political obligations and to appease vengeful
86
politicians, Secretary of War Stanton pursued an unofficial objective, 
using the court to find concrete fault with and to convict Buell, This 
objective was, as Wallace stated in his autobiography, bluntly blurted 
out to the other board members by Judge Advocate Piatt as the proceed­
ings began:
He {PiattJ gave us to understand at an early period of our sessions 
that we were "organized to convict," meaning, as we took him, that 
Secretary Stanton and General Halleck were desirous of getting rid 
of General Buell, and had selected us to do the work.^2
The political motive behind the government's formation of the
Buell Commission was directly responsible for an essential factor that
made its proceedings a microcosm of the Union command problem. For in
deciding that the commission was to be used to convict Buell in order
to appease politicians, Stanton also unexpectedly decided, perhaps with
a certain degree of remorse, that Buell should be present to undertake 
°3his own defense.'' This unusual act meant introducing a foreign element 
into the commission that was never meant to be— of course much of the 
whole affair was most unusual. By definition, the Buell Military Com­
mission was never meant to have a defendent present, since no one was 
being charged with anything. As Wallace had stated in defining the 
commission's purpose, there were no definite charges or accused; it was
" . . . simply an investigation of general operations which certain
0 /officers of the Army are charged to make." Stanton's order did list 
five objections against Buell, but these were not official charges to 
be investigated. The unusual character of Stanton's action was under­
lined by the curious scene that followed on the first day of the 
proceedings when Buell appeared at the courtroom door seeking entry.
The board members, because of an uncertainty of definition, were simply
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unable to deal with him. First they decided to allow him to enter, 
but only after being sworn to secrecy concerning the proceedings. 
Apparently they classified him simply as an observer. When Buell 
objected to this they refused to allow him to be present at all. They 
finally decided to allow him to enter--without having to be sworn in—  
but only on the condition that he could not cross-examine witnesses but 
could only introduce and examine witnesses for the defense. Buell 
again objected and was again refused entry. Finally, after unsuccess­
fully trying to have Buell define his own position, the board members 
admitted temporary defeat and adjourned for the day without further 
decision, leaving Buell waiting outside the closed doors.^ Shortly 
after, the court allowed him to enter, to examine and cross-examine 
witnesses, and to assume the role of defendent, but under the stipulation 
that he was not to be recognized officially as the defendent:
Under the correct reading of the order General Buell is permitted 
to attend, not to answer specific charges, but rather for the 
purpose of assisting in the investigation. General Buell has 
elected to appear in the light of a defendent, but it does not 
follow that all the belongings, attributes, and privileges pertain­
ing to a person in that position are to be granted to General Buell.^6
Aside from causing disconcertion among board members, Stanton's 
unexpected decision to add the position of defense to a proceeding that 
was neither a trial nor court of inquiry but an investigative court, 
completed a setting which produced a microcosm of the Union command 
problem. This investigative structure, involved as it was with broad 
objectives under a general topic, together with a prosecution and a 
defense- that represented, as Wallace inadvertently pointed out, the two 
different philosophical schools of Union command (Grant-Sherman versus 
Buell-McClellan), resulted in one of the few times during the war that
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these two groups came together in a formal clash of military philosophy. 
Both groups had of course met and displayed their contrasting ideas on 
the battlefield in the two years before the commission convened and 
would continue to meet in the two years after. However, their meetings 
on the field always remained cushioned by the war or by some intervening 
factor such as rank that prevented the direct confrontation of their 
philosophical positions. This clash behind commission doors is the 
microcosm of the Union command problem which is the heart of this study.
This view of the command problem is due specifically to the fact 
that the prosecution and defense represented the separate sides of 
Jomini's and Saxe's "art (risk) versus science (rules)" philosophy of 
war, and in this regard reflected, by their contrasting attitudes, an 
illuminating example of the lack of balance that was the command problem. 
Throughout the commission, the "Buell-McClellan" defense, as would be 
expected from viewing its battlefield counterpart, was primarily con­
cerned with the science of war needed to achieve the objective. But it 
often lost sight of the objective itself. In contrast, the "Grant- 
Sherman" prosecution, representative of total war attitudes, was 
primarily concerned with the objective but often had little regard for 
the means (science) necessary to fight the enemy and achieve the 
objective efficiently. Each side supplemented the shortcomings of the 
other.
To observe this microcosm we will examine first one side and 
then the other, then bring prosecution and defense together in order to 
note in their clash the lack of balance that was the command problem.
This procedure will cover four of the specific events included under 
Stanton's order convening the proceedings: I.) the march to Chattanooga,
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II.) the invasion of Kentucky. III.) the pursuit of Bragg, and
9 7IV.) Buell's conciliatory policy. '
I. The March to Chattanooga
The inarch of the Army of the Ohio to Chattanooga and East 
Tennessee in June 1862 proved to be a messy affair, for it involved all 
the horrors that can be related to logistics. Buell marched on a route 
three hundred miles long, through enemy countryside and with little 
cavalry (see Appendix A map). His obstacles included long lines of com­
munication, troops embarrassingly spread to protect these lines, major 
rivers to cross, and large bands of rebel cavalry roaming at will. If 
these were not difficulties enough, it was a march that had to be made 
quickly. Buell was actually in a race to Chattanooga, attempting to 
beat Bragg's rebel army moving on a parallel course to the south.
The importance and purpose of the march was equal to its prob­
lems, for Chattanooga and East Tennessee contained railroad connections 
that were vital to the South. Chattanooga was described by the Western 
Citizen as
the great railroad center of the South . . . and the point of con­
vergence for railroads already constructed from all the principal 
cities on the lower Mississippi to the Gulf of Mexico, and the 
Southern Atlantic, around the whole semicircle from Memphis, Tenn., 
including Little Rock, Ark., Vicksburg and Jackson, Miss., New 
Orleans, Mobile, Pensacola, Savannah, Charleston, Beaufort, N. 
Carolina; to Norfolk and Richmond.28
East Tennessee contained the important Virginia-Tennessee Railroad,
which connected Richmond and Manassas in the East with Atlanta and
Montgomery in the South.
Discussing the march, which fell under Stanton's fifth point ("to 
inquire and report upon such matters touching military operations above
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specified as in the judgment of the Commission shall be beneficial to 
the service"), y Buell and his various witnesses saw only the positive 
side associated with the science of war. Specifically, this point of 
view considered the affair a victory in view of the logistical problems 
the army had to face-even though Bragg reached Chattanooga first. The 
defense witness, Judge G. W. Lane (a resident of Huntsville, Alabama, 
for forty-five years), for example, presented the harsh facts which 
reminded everyone that Buell's army successfully survived in an area 
that was both naturally and unnaturally bare of supplies:
It is inhabited by the rich planters I have already described, 
who are satisfied to make merely enough to carry on the operations 
of their plantations and look to cotton as the source of their 
revenue. . . .
i I should say that 1861 was what was termed a bad year, for the 
grain crop was very short in North Alabama. Independent of that, 
in the month of February or March the Confederate army that fell 
back from Bowling Green and Fort Donelson passed through North 
Alabama and levied contributions upon the country as they passed 
through. These two facts, of a short crop and the Confederate 
army levying upon the people, made the supplies less than usual.^
Lack of subsistence became a constant theme upon which the 
defense relied. General William Sooy Smith added weight to this testi­
mony, emphasizing another theme to be encountered repeatedly: the poor 
lines available to Buell's forces, in this case the major West-East, 
Charleston-Memphis railroad between Corinth and Chattanooga:
The road had been greatly damaged by the destruction of its bridges 
and trestle work, both by our own troops and the troops of the 
enemy. . . .
There were seven locomotives captured to the Westward of 
Corinth, immediately after the evacuation of Corinth by the enemy, 
in a damaged condition; besides those there were perhaps half a 
dozen locomotives in and about Corinth, also in bad condition, but 
still in running order. Almost every one that was sent upon that 
part of the line under my charge broke down and became utterly 
worthless; scarcely any use could be made of them on our line.
There was a very limited number of cars available, and not over a 
dozen were employed at any time on the line between Corinth and 
Decatur during my superintendence there.
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Bleak facts concerning communication troubles and scarcity of 
supplies were only part of the defense’s claim for the logistical 
success of the Union Army, and they tended to serve as a basis for 
another category of countless examples that glorified the army's reaction 
to these problems. As typically found in defense witness General Thomas 
L. Crittenden's description of the forage problem, this response showed 
a genuine pluckiness in the Union Army that was admirable and winning 
in itself:
Afterwards, on the very day I got to Stevenson, we received the 
news of the taking of Murfreesborough, and the interruption there 
made the supplies very scarce for a long time. We lived on half 
rations for, I should think, a month from the time I reached Battle 
Creek. . . .
I found the supply of forage quite scarce. I had expected some 
i forage, had been notified that I might look for some, but none was 
ever supplied me. I supplied myself with a great deal of difficulty, 
taking forage where I found it. I made every possible exertion. 
General Nelson was in command there, and I remember having some 
little quarrel because I thought his animals were living a little 
better than mine were. I thought he obtained it from the supply 
train; and I remember his telling me that I would have to work for 
myself— there was no other way of getting it; and I made every 
possible exertion to obtain forage. I moved my camp once during 
the few days I remained at Athens in order to get forage or to get 
nearer to it.32
This plucky reaction of the Army of the Ohio to logistics prob­
lems was perhaps best illustrated by Buell himself, with the result 
that he was portrayed as possessing an admirable degree of administrative 
tenacity. A case in point was supplied by a defense witness, Lieutenant 
Colonel Francis Darr, who explained Buell's difficulties with river 
captains and the seemingly impossible problem of supplying troops by 
way of the Tennessee River in their march to Chattanooga:
It was at first considered impossible to so supply the troops 
on account of Colbert's Shoals. By General Buell's orders all the 
river pilots acquainted with those waters and living in the surround­
ing country were seized one night at midnight, and kept under close 
guard to run our steamers, because Union pilots then in the employ 
of the general were unwilling to undertake running boats to Tuscumbia.
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So difficult was the navigation that I went up on the first boat 
myself from Eastport to Tuscumbia. We stuck for half a day on the 
Shoals, and no boat went up the river without sticking there and 
having considerable trouble. Every boat had to be sent up by force, 
and threats were made against the captain and the crew.3-3
The Grant-Sherman prosecution in the commission (the President 
Judge Advocate, board members, and their various witnesses), was unim­
pressed by the defense position that the march was logistically 
successful. Displaying the total war philosophy that recognized only 
the art (risk) of war with little regard for science, Buell's adversaries 
instead chose to view the tribulations of the march as secondary and a 
matter of course. They were primarily concerned with results, stressing 
the objectives of Chattanooga and East Tennessee. In a typical prosecu­
tion response, Wallace talked about "making everything bend" in moving 
toward Chattanooga and questioned whether a temporary solution to the 
subsistence problem would not have allowed the Army of the Ohio once in 
Chattanooga to stage a raid against the railroad in East Tennessee:
"Was not the country at least capable of subsisting the army while on its 
march, without any reference to supplies ahead, supposing you had gleaned 
it thoroughly, making everything bend to be subsistence of your army?"
He also wondered whether,
With Chattanooga in General Buell's possession, with his 
supplies collected from East Tennessee and all the region commanded 
by Chattanooga, could not the Army of the Ohio have been subsisted 
long enough at that point to have covered expeditions and detach­
ments sent to destroy that railroad [Virginia-Tennessee] as far east
as Jonesborough?34
Wallace's concentration on the objective of Chattanooga with little 
regard for means also caused him to question whether the Union troops 
did not become mere observers— as far as their ability to concentrate
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and fight— in their widespread protection of supply lines; this legiti­
mate question defense witness General Crittenden found somewhat hard to 
answer:
I cannot say that. General Buell might have undertaken some 
other enterprise that he considered feasible if he thought he could 
not take Chattanooga. If the army had remained in that position 
and undertaken no other enterprise, I should have considered it 
posted just to watch the movements of Bragg.35
For his part, the Judge Advocate offered another example of the prosecu­
tion's viewpoint, stressing the relatively undefended condition of 
Chattanooga, and the unimportance of logistical concerns, when calculating 
the time necessary to reach East Tennessee;
General Buell, in command of what has since been known as the Army 
of the Ohio, was sent in the direction of Chattanooga, with instruc­
tions to seize that place and through it East Tennessee. It has 
been proved on the part of the Government and not denied by the 
defense that the rebels were not in force at that time in either 
place, and had General Buell pushed on he would have taken the 
more important strategic points almost without resistance. . . .
The lack of supplies cannot justify a delay of a month or six 
weeks for repairs when that time would have enabled the army to 
seize and occupy a country rich as was East Tennessee, and inhabited 
by a friendly, loyal population. , . ,
If the army had supplies enough to justify the long delay for 
the purpose of reconstructing lines, which were cut almost as 
rapidly as they were connected, I hold that he had sufficient to 
seize and hold East Tennessee.36
The prosecution witnesses naturally agreed with this stress on 
objective. J. B. McElwee, a resident of Thea County in East Tennessee, 
stated that Chattanooga was lightly defended, that the rebels were 
ready to surrender, and gave the impression that the Union forces could 
have walked into the city;
I left Chattanooga and went down to Dalton, and part of the rebel 
force came there that night. My understanding was that they were 
taking the sick and wounded away. They stopped all the rolling 
stock of the road; they brought down all the rolling stock that was 
at Chattanooga and stopped any from going up. My understanding from 
rebel soldiers and others was that they were going to surrender 
Chattanooga, . . .
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I cannot tell what the number was, but it was not very large,
There were not more than 1,000 or 1,500 men.
Both defense and prosecution were right in their views of the Chattanooga 
March, for their contrasting views represented the two sides of Jomini's 
and Saxe's balance of art and science in war.
However, both sides of the commission failed to understand the 
natural, complementary balance needed between art (risk) and science 
(rules). The numerous logistical problems (science) were very real, 
and had to be met in order to attain the objective of Chattanooga and 
East Tennessee; an army did move on its stomach. At the same time, 
however, the logistical difficulties were so numerous, and so frequently 
unsolvable to full satisfaction, that a commander could become so 
engrossed in their details that he lost sight of his objective. To 
prevent this from happening he had to keep logistical problems in proper 
perspective, accepting them as inconveniences that somehow had to be 
overcome without fear or undue involvement, and as cheaply as possible. 
The failure of the two sides of the court to achieve the proper intel­
lectual balance on this point of dissension was specifically illustrated 
by the clash between the Judge Advocate and General Thomas L. Crittenden, 
a witness for the defense. Both were unable to recognize fully the 
other's viewpoint as they attempted to balance considerations of objec­
tive and dash versus various "contingencies."
Question, [Judge Advocate, Prosecution] You said the distance 
from Stevenson [Battle Creek] to Chattanooga was 40 miles. How many 
days' provisions would have been necessary to have made a dash at 
Chattanooga?
[Answer, General Crittenden, Defense.] That would depend upon 
so many contingencies that I scarcely know how to answer. To have 
marched to Chattanooga with no opposition and with forced marches 
it might have been done in two days, but to have marched there and
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encountered such obstacles as an enemy could have interposed in 
that country I think it would not have been prudent to start with 
less than eight or ten days' provisions, and unless we were quite 
sure of succeeding when we got there it would be unsafe with that,
Question. Was not a movement on Chattanooga with ten days' 
subsistence as practicable as Bragg's movement across the Tennessee 
with ten days' and only three wagons to a brigade?
[Answer.] I think that Bragg's movement was a very extra­
ordinary one certainly, and that the other movement would have been 
a very extraordinary one. As far as I understand the movement, I 
think that Bragg's was more feasible than the movement on Chatta­
nooga with eight or ten day's supplies. Bragg had a railroad behind 
him. IBuell also did,] Bragg knew that he could avoid the enemy. 
Bragg had a people who sympathized with him very much through whose 
country he was to march, and I suppose he had an accurate knowledge, 
for I suppose that he obtained all such information possible of all 
our forces and our strength.38
This same lack of balance was even more notable in the question­
ing, of General Thomas J. Wood concerning the march to Chattanooga. 
Thinking in the Grant^-Sherman tradition, the prosecution again displayed 
only a total war concern for the objective of Chattanooga, while the 
defense again showed the equally limited emphasis on means and science, 
as typified the Buell-McClellan generals:
Question [Prosecution]. Supposing within a week or ten days 
after the evacuation of Corinth by the enemy the Army of the Ohio 
had as rapidly as possible, considering the necessity of supplies 
and the transportation furnished that army, pushed on to Chattanooga, 
by the route you have specified, what in your opinion would have 
been the result?
[Answer, General Wood.] I think we could have taken Chattanooga. 
• • •
In the early month of July, when I got as far as Decatur and 
Huntsville, I considered it certainly within the range of the capa­
bility and power of the Army of the Ohio to have taken Chattanooga; 
moveover, I supposed the object of our movement in that direction 
was for that purpose. . . .
Question [Defense]. Suppose the Army of the Ohio had marched 
to Chattanooga without meeting a man last summer, how long do you 
think it could have remained there with an enemy not more than 
30,000 strong on its communications?
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[Answer, General Wood.] I should think only a few days; perhaps 
long enough to have broken up some important links in the railroad 
communications in the way of bridges, and then it would, in my 
opinion, with 30,000 men acting on its communications, have been 
compelled to fall back. . . .
Question [Defense]. Would a force that might be sufficient to 
hold Chattanooga and cover its communications be sufficient to 
advance toward Cleveland, Dalton, also, and especially to advance 
further toward the south and east? [The defense implies here that 
the capture of Chattanooga would not have allowed movement into 
East Tennessee.]
[Answer, General Wood.] No sir; I do not think it would. . . .
Question [Defense]. Do or do not the railroads converging upon 
it [Chattanooga] from the east and south make it an exposed point 
for our troops?
[Answer, General Wood.] I should say so, unquestionably.^
II, The Rebel Invasion of Tennessee
Bragg's invasion of Western Tennessee, moving from Chattanooga, 
across the Cumberland Mountains, the Tennessee River, and into the 
Sequatchie Valley toward Nashville (see Appendix B map), was the first 
topic of importance mentioned in Stanton's order convening the Court, 
although in the sequence of events it followed the march to Chattanooga.
For the Buell-McClellan defense, with its primary concern for 
the science and rules of war over the art and risk involved in securing 
the military objective, this invasion meant not the possibility of 
battle but the necessity of retreat. Specifically, the defense empha­
sized the necessity of the Army of the Ohio's steady retrograde movement 
west away from the enemy and towards Nashville in order to protect its 
lines of communication and supply. The two arguments most persistently 
used to justify the retreat were, first, the water shortage and the 
general inability of the Union army to subsist on the countryside ("it 
is a very poor country indeed; land thin, little cultivation, and almost
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impossible to obtain any forage for animals in that locality for any 
length of time"),^ and second, the shortage of Union cavalry and the 
almost wanton destruction of bridges, railroads, and supply depots 
behind Union lines by large-scale rebel cavalry raids. The problem of 
the Confederate cavalry, noted here in a discussion between Buell and 
defense witness General James B. Fry, was one of the most effective used 
by the defense to support the contention that the Union force had to 
retreat in order to save its lines:
Question .[Buell, Defense]. While the rebel army was advancing 
in front were the communications of the Army of the Ohio unmolested. 
If not, how were they interfered with and what cavalry force had 
the commander of the Army of the Ohio to guard against the danger 
from that cause?
[Answer, Defense Witness Fry.] As heretofore stated, the com­
munications of the Army of the Ohio were molested by the rebel 
cavalry while the main army advanced. The cavalry force of the 
Army of the Ohio was insufficient to guard against the dangers to 
which the Army was exposed by the operations of the rebel cavalry. 
The commander of the Army of the Ohio was able to concentrate only 
eight regiments of cavalry, and this was done by stripping the 
divisions; the regiments were much reduced in number, were run down 
by having been overworked, and in some cases not well managed and 
cared for, and in most cases having been insufficiently well armed, 
equipped, or instructed.41
The general attitude displayed here by the defense in justifying 
retreat in the face of an invading army if all logistical details were 
not satisfactorily taken care of was nicely summarized by Buell, who 
recited a "sphere of offensive" doctrine while questioning one of his 
witnesses, General J. T. Boyle. It was a doctrine that drew a neat 
logistical boundary line on the field of battle, with the enemy con­
sidered a kind of secondary consequence:
Question. Do you understand, general, that in all military 
operations the sphere of offensive movements is limited by certain 
circumstances, such as the amount of supplies and the distance to 
which you can carry supplies with the means available, and perhaps 
by other considerations also? Does it not follow, then, that an
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army may be on the defensive for everything beyond the sphere which 
is limited by these circumstances, and that within that sphere it 
may assume the offensive if an enemy should come within its reach?^^
In contrast to the defense, the Grant-Sherman prosecution
weighed only the opportunity of fighting the invading rebel force, with
little regard for the problem of how it was to be done. In the minds of
these total-war generals, troops were readily placed on half rations
rebel attacks on railroad lines and bridges were considered a minimal
44concern in comparison to the enemy; and the desolate countryside of 
Tennessee and Kentucky was not considered quite so desolate, offering 
a significant source of supply;
Question .[Prosecution] . Do you not know that the published 
statistics, such as those of 1850, made by the Government, show that 
,the counties of Middle Tennessee and East Tennessee give a very 
large surplus in grain and produce of that sort?
[Answer, Defense Witness, Lieut, Col. Francis Darr.] I am not 
aware of that fact; but the fact of a region raising more produce 
than is requisite for the supply of the inhabitants thereof does 
not involve that it should be impossible for that region to import 
large supplies. , . .
Question [Prosecution]. Would not a country that would furnish 
provisions to a rebel army no more loyal than the States of Tennessee 
and Kentucky, under proper military management, furnish at least half 
rations for an army of the same size as that of Bragg's? [Reference 
is to the fact that the rebel army subsisted without supply lines in 
two states whose population was neither strongly unionist or seces­
sionist but equally divided in its stand.]
[Answer, Prosecution Witness, General George H. Thomas.] Yes,
I suppose it would.45
All this was supposedly proof that the Army of the Ohio could 
have met Bragg instead of moving to Nashville to safeguard its supply 
lines. This line of reasoning also served as the basis for the more 
ominous question of Buell's loyalty, which was often repeated by the 
prosecution in its stress on Bragg rather than problems of science.
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Question {General Dana, Prosecution]. What was supposed in the 
army to be the reason why General Buell did not wish his army to 
fight that of the rebel Bragg?
{Answer, General J. B. Steedman, Prosecution.] Various reasons 
were assigned. Some ascribed it to timidity, some to prudence.
There were all sorts of reasons; some went so far as to impugn the 
loyalty of General Buell. For myself I never doubted his loyalty, 
though I have heard considerable said on that point— that General 
Buell did not desire to whip Bragg.
Question. On account of his disloyalty?
{Answer.] Yes; I have heard charges of disloyalty against him.
Question. Were these charges of disloyalty made against General 
Buell by officers in high rank?
[Answer.] I have heard officers of the rank of brigadier- 
general, colonels, and lieutenant-colonels charge General Buell 
with disloyalty.46
> The anti-Buell element of the Commission also contended that 
Buell's logistical problems were equal to Bragg's, thus supposedly 
reducing the importance of the problems themselves and increasing the 
responsibility of Buell to have made a stand against his equally afflicted 
adversary. General Tyler, together with a prosecution witness, dis­
creetly implied that if Bragg could invade without water Buell could 
defend without water;
Question [General Tyler, Prosecution]. You say General Bragg's 
army passed out of the Cumberland Mountains at Pikeville; was it in 
General Buell's power to have concentrated forces enough at or near 
that point to have resisted successfully Bragg's advance or to have 
whipped him?
[Answer, J. B. Steedman, Prosecution Witness.] From what I 
have heard of the topography of the country and the scarcity of 
water I do not think that General Buell could have massed his troops 
near that point and given Bragg battle without a great deal of 
suffering because of the scarcity of water.
Question. Did not Bragg with his whole army pass over that 
ground and find a supply of water?
[Answer.] I have no doubt but what he did, though his army was 
stretched out very much.^7
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The Judge Advocate, Donn Piatt, also implied that there was a degree of 
timidity involved in Buell's failure to meet the enemy, He pointed to 
the rebel supply situation if Bragg had been met and forced to stop in 
the mountains and questioned, "Which army would have had the advantage 
in the matter of supplies, one drawing from McMinnville and Nashville 
and the other from Chattanooga?"^ The implication was that Buell had 
the better position and hence was negligent in his decisions.
In a series of questions that implied criticism of the defense's 
"sphere of offensive" (logistics first) doctrine the Judge Advocate 
offered a nice summary of the overall attitude of his side of the 
commission toward the invasion of Kentucky:
, Question. Are not the actual circumstances attending a campaign 
so varied and expanded and the maxims of war so numerous that a 
supposable case gives little light? , . .
Was not Bragg's extraordinary march in and out of Kentucky in 
violation of the more important maxims of war; and was not the 
attempt to meet him by the strict adherance to such maxims of war 
a hinderance to our success? . . ,
Are not the rules of prudence, caution, and so forth, as applica­
ble to an enemy invading a country and moving in the same direction 
as the opposing force of superior numbers; and was not the success 
of the inferior invading army to be attributed to the wholesale 
disregard of those rules?^^
The differences of opinion between the prosecution and defense 
about the dangers posed by Bragg's invasion represented the two sides 
of the delicate, balanced, natural art-versus-science philosophy of war, 
and thus represented a courtroom extension of the Union command problem. 
Inadequate balance is more graphically illustrated by the relation of 
the discussion of the invasion to the disposition of Buell's army at 
Sparta to meet Bragg. Sparta was a small town seventy miles southeast 
of Nashville, and one of three likely points the rebel commander could 
have chosen in his invasion, For the science minded Buell-McClellan
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defense, Sparta was a possible trap for the Union army, a position in 
which one could be stranded by the enemy without any means of supply.
The defense repeatedly asserted that with Union troops at Sparta, Bragg 
would have taken advantage of a fork in the road at Spencer, fourteen 
miles from the Union position, turned quickly to the left and, marching 
by a different route through McMinnville, could have captured the main 
Union supply depots at Murfreesborough and Nashville before the displaced 
Sparta troops had a chance to react:
Question [Buell, Defense]. What advantage would the rebel army 
have had if it had reached McMinnville while the Army of the Ohio 
was at Sparta looking for it there, and what would have been the 
embarrassment of the Army of the Ohio from such a result?
[Answer, General Thomas L. Crittenden, Defense Witness.] With 
the rebel army at McMinnville, the Army of the Ohio at Sparta would 
have been deprived of all its sources of supplies by reaching 
Murfreesborough and Nashville first, I should think. It would have 
been almost fatal to the Army of the Ohio to have been cut off from 
Murfreesborough and Nashville by the rebel army in our then condi­
tion of supplies.50
For the prosecution, however, Sparta was a place to fight, with 
limited, but sufficient, supplies on hand to meet Bragg’s army.
Prosecution witness George H. Thomas presented a typical example of 
this view when cross-examined by Buell:
[Answer.] I should have concentrated the army sufficiently to 
have fought at Sparta and urged General Buell to do so. His reply 
to me was that we had not subsistence enough at Murfreesborough to 
enable us to do so. . . .
I believe now that the supplies were very limited at Murfrees­
borough. I did not know at that time anything about the state of 
supplies, as I was far away on the flank of the army. . . .
Well, I think it was practicable; I think we had supplies 
enough to have enabled us to have met the enemy, fought, and 
whipped him. . . .51
The defense had a good point, for it highlighted the prosecution's 
naivetd in desiring to fight a total war without seriously considering 
limited supplies and the possibility of the rebel army sweeping around
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Sparta. At the same time the defense revealed its own limitations, for 
it failed to demonstrate the same desire to fight that Thomas and the 
total war prosecution possessed. In this regard, the defense ironically 
endorsed the actual result, which was the retreat of the Army of the 
Ohio to Nashville and the establishment of a strong "sphere of offensive, 
while Bragg's army marched through Sparta, by-passed this "sphere," and 
moved into Kentucky towards Louisville. It was a courtroom example of 
the ill-balanced outlook toward war that was the Union command problem.
III. The Escape of the Rebels from Kentucky
Another example of this clash of philosophy between the Grant-
Sherman prosecution and Buell-McClellan defense concerned the escape of
the rebels from Kentucky after their check at the Battle of Perryville.
This escape by Bragg and his army began in the early dawn of October 9,
1862, and ended ten days and two hundred and eighty miles later, with
the Confederate Army marching through the Cumberland Gap into East
Tennessee. It was a roundabout movement, that moved almost half-circle
before arriving at its destination. From Perryville Bragg had moved
due north twenty-eight miles to Harrodsburg on October 10th, joining
there the army of Kirby Smith; from there he moved fourteen miles east,
crossing Dick's River (or Dix River), and arriving at Bryantsville on
October 11th and Camp Dick Robinson on October 12th. From this latter
point, as Bragg stated, "accordingly all necessary arrangements were
made and the troops put in motion by two columns, under Major-Generals
Polk and Smith, on October 13, for Cumberland Gap." This latter path
led back past Perryville, although fourteen to twenty-eight miles east
of the town (see Appendix C for Bragg's retreat route). 52
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While the rebel army was following this circuitous route, Buell 
was situated at Perryville, spending his time reorganizing the battle- 
scarred part of his army:
A good deal of the ammunition of McCook's corps and some in the 
center corps had been expended in the battle of the 8th, and so 
much of the means of transportation had been required for pro­
visions that wagons could not be spared for sufficient supply of 
reserve ammunition on starting from Louisville. This was hurried 
forward and other matters attended to in the condition of the army 
which had resulted from the battle.53
He was also sending out reconnaissances: "Strong cavalry reconnaissances
had been kept out everyday, but on the evening of the 10th I ordered out
three brigades of infantry with cavalry to move on the 11th to discover
more of the position or movements of the e n e m y . B u t  mostly he was
waiting for the reinforcements of General Sill's division from Frankfort,
Kentucky. The time lost by the Union forces gave Bragg the opportunity
he needed to make good his retreat, for on the 11th of October Sills
arrived, on the 12th Buell moved forward, and by the 14th was pressing
the enemy rearguard in its movement toward the Gap. But as Buell stated
(with the bogus optimism of a less-than-victorious commander), "no
general battle occurred between the two armies, though the enemy was
foiled in his object and driven from the State."55
Discussion of Buell's pursuit of Bragg (the fourth topic listed
under Stanton's order), produced the expected clash between the defense
and prosecution about the possibility of the rebel general's escape.
The Buell-McClellan defense, with its concern for means and science
rather than objective, emphasized the problems Buell faced pursuing the
retreating Bragg. It thereby presented a picture of inevitable escape
for the rebel army. One defense witness contended that the Army of the
Ohio was virtually paralyzed in the pursuit of Bragg because of a need
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to reorganize and recuperate from the effects of battle, because of
darkness, and because of Kirby Smith and the possibility of another
battle; this line of reasoning was continuously stressed by the defense.
The fact that Kirby Smith had reached Harrodsburg and the impesssion 
that Bragg had received re-enforcements was that we should have 
another battle. The general confusion, too, that ensues in any 
army after a battle made some delay necessary. I suppose that these 
were the reasons why we did not advance at once upon Harrodsburg and 
ascertain whether the rebels were flying or not; but this is my 
supposition only. . . .
It was nearly night when Bragg left Perryville. I suppose 
night would have stopped us from any immediate pursuit, and suppose 
we did not follow up to Harrodsburg on the next day for the reasons 
that I have just stated. Kirby Smith was said to be in line of 
battle at Harrodsburg, and I suppose the commanding general thought 
it important to rest his army after the battle, and see what its 
condition really was before he advanced upon the army, which at 
that time was believed to have inflicted a disaster upon us and not 
to have been defeated.56
Other defense witnesses repeatedly pointed out the necessity of waiting
three days for Sills and reinforcements because of the percentage of
raw troops in the ranks: "I believe the old troops I had were superior
to the troops of the rebel army," testified one major general, but
my new troops were vastly inferior. There was one regiment of new 
troops to each brigade, and Jackson's division, consisting of two 
brigades, were all new troops. . . .
On one side nearly all veteran troops, under perfect discipline; 
on the other, a portion, the old "army of the Ohio," equally good, 
but more than one—third of the whole raw and undisciplined.57
The defense also contended that even without the head start necessarily
given to the rebels Bragg and his army would have escaped. General
Thomas L. Crittenden diligently listed all the problems he faced that
made it impossible for him, once on the march, to have stopped his
adversaries:
The nature of the country was such as to enable very few men with 
light guns, such as the cavalry had, always to impede our progress. 
In addition to other difficulties placed before us with their guns, 
and taking advantage of extraordinary passes through this broken 
country, they also obstructed our way by cutting down trees and
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gave us a great deal of work by tearing up the road. . . . The 
country is barren, and we had some difficulty in keeping the 
animals from perishing for want of something to eat. There is no 
road by which the enemy could be pursued except the main road, nor 
is there any road by which they could have been intercepted.58
Buell best summarized the defense attitude, considering only problems
and not opportunities, in effect conceding Bragg's inevitable escape
from Kentucky:
There are few circumstances under which a disciplined and well 
managed army can be forced to a general battle against its will.
. . . A disciplined army, moving on its line of communication, can 
always retreat more rapidly than it can be pursued. . . . The 
pursuing army, on the other hand, finds the country stripped; it 
has nothing in advance to rely on; it must carry everything along 
with the hinderance of enormous trains, and the difficulties are 
increased with every day's march. , . . The retreating army pre­
pares a front of resistance more rapidly than the pursuer can prepare 
a front for attack. The strong positions are reconnoitered in 
,advance, on which the requisite force forms as rapidly as on a drill 
field; while the pursuer, ignorant of the ground and the force that 
awaits him, must inform himself of both in order to develop a cor­
responding force, or else find the head of the column beaten back.
In the mean time the main body of the retiring army has gained some 
hours' march,59
In contrast to the defense, the Grant-Sherman prosecution 
reflected only a total war (art and risk) view of the pursuit of Bragg.
It was a view which meant ignoring various problems such as topography, 
in order to support the position that Bragg should not have escaped and 
that immediate pursuit and battle should have occurred. It proved to be 
a somewhat fanciful position that concentrated on desire more than fact. 
General J. B. Steedman, for example, in typical prosecution response, 
displayed only hindsight in stating that the Union troops moving 
towards Bragg were constantly held back by high command when they should 
not have been:
I am undertaking to show by my testimony that the corps commander 
placed by General Buell over three divisions of that army would not 
allow it to move as rapidly as it desired to move upon the enemy, 
and was very much afraid it would get cut off if it attempted to
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cut off a small body of cavalry and a couple of pieces of artillery 
that were impeding it on the road. . . .  I think if the column 
on that road [Springfield to PerryvilleJ, in which my brigade lay 
had been permitted to move as rapidly as its division and brigade 
commanders desired it to move that the enemy would have been 
punished more than he was. . . .
After the battle the pursuit on one of the roads was something 
of the same character; that several times during the pursuit our 
advance was checked and held back by small bodies of cavalry with 
artillery.60
General George E. Thomas, in another example of this impulsive 
prosecution attitude towards pursuit, bluntly stated that another battle 
and the prevention of Bragg's retreat could have occurred if the Union 
army had simply marched to various points east of Perryville and stopped 
Bragg in his circular march back towards the south and the Cumberland 
Gap (but in his concentration on battle and the enemy Thomas tended to 
ignore the impossibility of foreseeing Bragg's return south):
X think as soon as we could determine whether the enemy was 
going to retreat across Dick's River we ought to have marched upon 
Danville or Lancaster or Stanford, whichever we could have effected.
I think, sir, we should have had, in all probability, another 
battle, depending upon the good management of our army whether it 
would have been a complete disaster to the enemy or not.61
General Alexander McCook, for the prosecution, asked to explain 
the delay in pursuit, ignored the need for reinforcement and recuperation 
of troops, claiming there was no reason why the rebels were not "vigor­
ously pursued." "No reason whatever," he complained. "I believe they 
should have been vigorously pursued next morning at daylight. I will 
state that my troops, who fought all day without water, could have 
occupied the part of a reserve very well."oz
Prosecution witness General Thomas J. Wood, asked to describe 
events in the Army immediately after Perryville, remembered only the 
languid, calm atmosphere that settled over the Union camp while Bragg 
was rapidly escaping:
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I cannot say I knew or heard any movement taking place either 
that night, next morning, or the next day that could properly be 
called an effort to renew the battle on the part of the Army of the 
Ohio. Some movements were ordered in the corps to which my division 
was attached for an advance toward Perryville during the morning of 
the 9th, but such advance did not take place until after it was 
known that the enemy had evacuated the position in and around 
Perryville, and in fact till I had been in the suburbs of the place 
myself.
Seeing the rebel escape only as an incomprehensible blunder, the 
Judge Advocate summarized the prosecution position in a brief review 
that left out the problems of science presented by the defense, and 
showed only the total war Cart) side of pursuit:
This blow [Perryvillej seems to have paralyzed the Army of the 
Ohio. No further effort was made to find and attack the enemy from 
the 8th till the 12th. No advance was even ordered. In the mean 
time the rebels retreated through Harrodsburg past our forces to 
Camp Dick Robinson. This was the third time a march of this kind 
was successful. A pursuit was then ordered that resulted in 
no tiling. 64
Both sides of the court again reflected in their contrasting 
views a philosophical failure that was the Union command problem. The 
Buell-McClellan defense was unable to balance properly the objective of 
Bragg's army and the need for risk and initiative combined with science 
in pursuing the enemy. The concentration on problems of topography, 
raw troops, reinforcements, and the general disadvantages of the pursuer 
emphasized by this side of the commission, represented a lack of initia­
tive not found in prosecution supporters. Some of the anti-Buell 
witnesses had shown far more initiative than their commander. Col. R.
B. Mitchel, for example, recalled that on the night of the day of the 
Battle of Perryville he was far ahead of his lines on an elevation over­
looking Perryville and shooting across the town at a rebel battery.^ 
There was also prosecution witness Col. G. D. Wagner, who marched his 
brigade at daybreak to an advanced position in sight of the retreating
108
enemy that was to be his corps' objective for the day, and who would 
have continued to move toward the enemy except, as he explained to the 
commission, for the lack of proper orders.
The reason that I did not advance farther that morning into the 
town and beyond it and undertake to cut off those troops that were 
retreating was because I was then much farther advanced than I was 
ordered to go. I had gone about as far as I thought I dared go 
without being ordered.
Col. A. D. Streight, who testified for the prosecution, felt the same
curiosity to find out, while the rest of the Union army slept, what the
enemy was up to on the morning after Perryville. His troops also
advanced without orders, and was close enough to the enemy to observe 
6 7its position. 7
, , The Grant-Sherman prosecution failed in turn to recognize the 
science (rules). of war necessary for a successful pursuit of Bragg.
The anxiousness of General McCook to "vigorously pursue" the enemy, the 
plan by General Thomas to march sharply east in order to gain another 
battle with. Bragg's Army, or General Steedman's impatience at being 
enchained by high command, still did not take into account certain 
practical concerns. General Lovell H. Rousseau, for the defense, under­
lined this need for practicality in his conception of Bragg as a "lion 
in the jungle"; the concept reflected the necessity of caution and 
science in pursuit. To Rousseau, the enemy was more than just a defeated 
foe to be pounced on— he was rather a wounded foe who always had the 
advantage of determining the point of attack. "I had the impression," 
Rousseau warned,
from the repeated assurances of Bragg and the boasts of seccession- 
ists of the State, as well as from the numbers that were joining 
him, that he did not intend to leave the State without a general 
battle. I felt that we might come upon General Bragg any day between 
Bardstown and the mountains just where he might choose to select his
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line of battle; and I felt another tiling, too, that approaching 
Bragg was like hunting a "lion in the jungle." He had the best 
army for its numbers that I ever saw.6°
IV. General Buell's Conciliatory Policy
In one instance the charges against Buell did not relate to the 
battlefield. Pursuing Edwin Stanton's fifth point, "to inquire and 
report upon such matters touching the military operations aforesaid as 
in the judgment of the Commission shall be beneficial to the Service, 
the Commission also dealt with the conciliatory policy towards the 
rebel citizenry practiced by the Army of the Ohio. It was a topic that 
perhaps best underlines, in its own subtle way, the difference between 
the art and science philosophies of the two sides of the commission.
To the science (rules) orientated defense-— with its secondary
concern for the enemy and objective—*-a peaceful, noncombatant enemy was
like a wayward child in need of efficient, structured rehabilitation
through fairness and example, rather than a crude slap of retribution.
It was this attitude that Russell Huston, a resident of Tennessee,
probably best summarized in contending that the Federal restoration of
the Union would have to be more than mere physical conquest of the South.
"I take the object of the United States," he testified,
to be to restore the Union; not merely a physical conquering or 
reannexing of territory in which the people are in rebellion, but, 
as far as it may be in the power of the Government to effect it to 
restore the affection of the people to the Government. . . .  I 
should say that such a course should be pursued as would effect the 
other purpose of restoring the love of the people for their country 
and Government. This may be accomplished to some extent, as I 
think, while the armies are passing through the country, but not by 
unnecessary harshness. I speak in reference to quiet and peaceable 
citizens.^
In support of this conciliatory policy, the defense repeatedly 
referred to the common law rights of the noncombatant in "civilized"
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warfare: "Is it usual among civilized nations to hold the inhabitants
of the country responsible for it I"it" referred to raids on the Louis- 
ville-Nashville-Decateur Railroad]? . . . Not that I know of. I think 
noncombatants are respected in their rights of property among civilized 
people."71 This view was supported by the contention that organized 
bands, not the majority of the inhabitants, were responsible for attacks 
on the army's lines:
I will state that in this part of the country the depredations they 
have committed have been committed against the desire of the people, 
so far as I know, and I know the people are complaining very bit­
terly of this kind of conduct, for they said, "if our lines are cut 
and destroyed the army in the State will subsist off the people, 
off the country; whereas if the lines are left open they will get 
their supplies from the North." I have heard this argument 
frequently by people who were not Union people.72
The harsh Confederate policy towards Union citizens in East Tennessee
was another point used by the defense to illustrate Buell's lenient
policy towards the rebel inhabitant. Buell's supporters contended
"that their {Unionists in East TennesseeJ bitterness for the rebel
authorities is very intense, and has been increased by the manner in
which they have been treated by those authorities."^ A large number
of defense witnesses also painted somewhat mawkish pictures of the
reaction of the rebel citizen to a policy of kindness and consideration.
Colonel Marc Mundy, for instance, described the rebel citizen as one
who became not only a loyal Unionist, but a loyal Christian under this
charitable treatment:
When I put a stop to the depredations the teamsters as well 
as the citizens found I was in earnest about it. I found that the 
citizens were freely disposed to give me notice of those who were 
interrupting our railroad and telegraphic communication; they 
freely supplied my hospitals with necessities gratuitously, and 
behaved generally as a loyal and Christian people.74
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The prosecution, in its total war concern for objectives and 
results with little regard for science, advocated a more severe policy 
toward the rebel citizen. As the Judge Advocate bluntly stated, this 
policy assumed "that a people freely sympathizing with the enemy and 
giving aid and comfort to the rebels have no rights which the Government 
is bound to r e s p e c t . I t  was not a policy which meant pillage, 
murder, and arson, as the defense liked to think, but instead, as prose­
cution witnesses testified, meant simply that war was war, with the 
rebel citizens' rights definitely secondary to those of the Union army. 
For example, prosecution witness General J. B. Steedman stated that for 
the short time needed to meet Bragg's invasion of Tennessee he would 
have lived off the country and if necessary forced the people to supply 
his army;
Of course I have no official information as to the number of 
rations at the disposal of General Buell at points between Nashville 
and Huntsville or Nashville and Decherd, along the line of the road, 
that were available; but I am confident that, for the short time 
that it would have been necessary to subsist the army anywhere in 
Tennessee to have whipped Bragg the army could have lived on the 
country, . . .
I would send a quartermaster out, with all the transportation 
of his regiment or of the brigade, to get supplies; direct him to 
order the negroes of the rebel citizens to hitch up their wagons—  
the same wagons they hitched up for the rebels— and haul such 
provisions as they had to camp. I could compel them to do it if 
they refused. In other words, I would coerce them to do precisely 
for us what they had done voluntarily for the rebels.?6
The Judge Advocate, Donn Piatt, went on to emphasize the point. 
After hearing that it would require ten thousand men to keep a certain 
supply road open, he hinted through the questioning of a defense witness 
that the best method to preserve the road was simply to threaten to 
burn out inhabitants living near it;
Question {Prosecution]. Would not that road have been protected 
between Bowling Green and Nashville under those circumstances if the
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inhabitants had been notified that for every interruption their 
country would be laid to waste right and left?
.[Answer, Defense Witness, Major W. H, Sidell.J That question 
involves so many considerations that I do not know how I can answer 
it categorically. It is not possible to decide what effect the 
declaration of such a policy would have throughout the State of 
Kentucky.
Question. Would it preserve the road?
IAnswer.J I think it would have a conservative effect on the 
road.77
A major argument in support of this harsher policy, repeatedly 
stressed by other prosecution witnesses, was that the rebel inhabitant 
was generally hostile. He burned bridges and destroyed railroad lines: 
"I always believed that all the citizens in that section of the country 
were engaged in annoying our trains. I know that some of them burned 
our railroad bridges. We never had a sufficient cavalry force down 
there to guard all that line."7® The rebel citizen also wantonly shot 
Union soldiers:
He was shot out of a house. I found his body lying there. I tried 
to burn the fields. Every person ran away from there; there was 
none but women left, no men. I cannot fix the place, general, it 
was where we had to leave the pike. The bridge had been burned 
down, so we had to go off the road, and I found the man; he had not 
been shot more than five minutes. It was in September. , . .
At McMinnville it was a nightly occurrence to have pickets shot 
at within two or three miles out of town.79
The hostility of the local inhabitants had a direct connection to the
subsistence problem:
Question [Prosecution]. Do you think that Middle Tennessee was 
competent in the month of October to supply from the country the 
army we had operated there?
[Answer, Witness, John G. Chandler.] I think it could have 
supplied an army of our strength, particularily a friendly army, 
or an army not in hostile country, where everything is concealed 
and information cannot be obtained as to where supply is.^0
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The prosecution generally concluded that the d e f e n s e ' s  soft 
policy tended to make the rebel citizen, if anything, more set against 
the Union than a harsher policy would have, since it betrayed weakness.
Question .[Prosecution]. So far as you have observed has not 
the effect of the policy that makes war upon the rebel in arms and 
gives the same protection to the man who sympathizes openly with 
the rebellion that it does to the good citizen been to convince the 
rebels that it arose rather from weakness than from our sense of 
justice?
[Answer, Prosecution Witness, W. G. Brownlow.] Yes, sir; this 
has been the result of my observation. They attribute our fore- 
bearance toward them to cowardice and think that we are afraid of 
them. It disheartens and discourages the Unionists. I heard them 
complain at Nashville even of Governor Johnson's forebearing and 
conciliatory course toward the rebels, . . .
Question. In disaffected districts, occupied first by one 
army and then another, has not the effect of the two policies, that 
,is, the policy exercised by our Government heretofore [defense] and 
that of the rebels, been to make it much safer for a man to be a 
rebel sympathizer than to sympathize with the Union?
lAnswer.J I have heard a leading and influential Union man 
assert that. I could not say of my own knowledge how it is. It 
is a very common remark, however, among the Unionists in Tennessee 
and Kentucky.81
These two views of the conciliatory policy, representing a 
subject matter different from specific battlefield activity— what 
Clausewitz called "war proper"^— seemed especially effective in cap­
turing the essence of the Union command problem. The defense's lenient 
policy toward the rebel citizen reflected a naivete directly related to 
its preference for the science and rules of waging war and hence to the 
Buell-McClellan brand of generalship. This naivetd was exposed, in one 
instance, when the Judge Advocate questioned the practicality of dis­
tinguishing the ''good" citizen from the "bad" one in a time of rebellion, 
intimating that the line was too fine for reliable judgment; but the 
defense witness was able to make only a befuddled response. (His
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questions are in reference to Buell's conciliatory policy as Commander 
of the Army of the Ohio, listed under Order 13A, and in essence the 
defense's policy)
Question {Judge Advocate], Why do you make a distinction between 
the man who carries the arms and the man who furnishes the arms and 
the sustenance for him?
[Answer by Defense Witness, Russell Huston.] It is very rarely 
to be found in the history of any wars that I have read of that war 
has been made upon peaceable citizens, men and women, who have no 
arms in their hands, but the business is to fight the men that have 
arms; this it seems to me, makes the distinction itself. . . .  I 
should certainly make a wide distinction between those two classes 
of persons. . . .
Question. Does this distinction that you speak of obtain in 
rebellion?
[Answer,J I think it ought to, when the object is to restore 
rthe greatest portion of the country to its loyalty. . . .
Question. As the conciliatory policy you speak of that was 
inaugurated by the commander of the Army of the Ohio depends upon 
the application of the order referred to, please tell us from your 
experience who were designated as peaceable citizens, who were to 
be protected, not to be molested, in their persons and property.
[Answer.] I do not know of any specific designation outside of 
this order and others that I may have seen. I put a construction 
on it myself, and supposed it meant persons who staid [sic] at home 
and attended to their business and did or said nothing against the 
Government in any shape or form.
Question. I ask you from your experience, and not from your 
construction of that order, whether citizens openly avowing disunion 
sentiments, having sons in the rebel army and having until our army 
arrived there, furnished those sons with subsistence, and willingly 
supported the rebel Government, were included in that order as 
persons not to be molested in their persons and property?*^
(The defense is implying that the part of Buell's Order dealing with the 
"peaceable citizen" actually punished only the rebel citizen who was 
openly caught giving comfort and aid to the Confederate cause, consider­
ing everyone else— those not caught— "peaceable.")
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[Answer,] I have no particular experience as to that matter.
I remember no particular case now. But I would regard a man talking 
secession openly as not a peaceable citizen; and I do not include 
such when I speak of a conciliatory policy.
Question. If your recollection furnishes no instance in illus­
tration of this sentence in the order, who were considered peaceable 
citizens and who were not, your observation has been somewhat 
limited, has it not?
[Answer.] I have been in Nashville most of the time since the 
Federal army arrived there and do not know of any arrests under 
this order. I do not know whether there was anything to be observed 
or not; at all events I observed but little,85
The prosecution's vigorous war policy, however, was not in turn 
completely right. What was lacking was the legitimate concern its 
counterpart had for the rebel citizen, a concern that may not have been 
entirely practical but was still important in a war that to a large 
extent included the masses rather than just fighting armies. The prose­
cution's policy toward the rebel citizen was practical and promised 
results, but it was also too callous in its tendency to lump all rebel 
citizenry together as one "people freely sympathizing with the enemy 
and giving aid and comfort to the rebels."^ It failed to consider a 
problem that Buell and one of the defense witnesses described as the 
rebel civilian who was loyal in heart but not by necessity:
Question {General Buell]. Do you not believe that there is a 
very considerable portion of the population of the Southern States, 
at least of some of them, who would be very glad to place themselves 
again under the protection of the Constitution if the power of the 
rebel Government and its means of coercion did not render it 
impossible for them to do so?
[Answer, Defense Witness, G. W. Lane.] I do, sir.
Question. Is it true that those people who are at heart loyal 
to the Union are almost universally supporters of the rebellion?
[Answer.] Yes sir; I believe there are a great many men (I 
speak more especially of my own section), who are loyal at heart, 
but who are professed secessionists; a state of things brought about 
by the fact that their families and property, depend upon their con­
forming to the requirements of the Confederate Government.
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Question. Are or are not justice, the security of constitutional 
rights, and other results following from our institutions the consid­
erations which have given rise to and have preserved this loyal 
sentiment in the people of the South toward the Constitution and the 
Government?
[Answer.J Yes sir; I should say unhesitatingly that it was.
Question. What, then, would be likely to be the effect of the 
policy and conduct upon these people which should violate all these 
principles? I do not speak now with reference to the people of the 
South more than to people everywhere.
[Answer.] The violation of justice and constitutional guar­
anties would in this case and everywhere be calculated to excite 
and enrage a loyal people, and I would go further, and say that it 
would be well calculated to estrange them from their Government,
To evaluate the Buell Commission as a microcosm of the Union 
command problem one needs first to consider certain basic factors which 
made it an ideal arena in which to examine differing philosophies of 
war. One factor was the anger and contempt shown Buell by Governors 
Andrew Johnson and Oliver P, Morton, for it led to the Federal Govern­
ment's desire to appease these politicians by using the vaguely 
investigative military commission instead of a court-martial or court 
of inquiry to try a military commander. There was also Stanton's 
decision to allow a defense that represented the "old army" views of 
Buell as opposed to the total war position of the prosecution. These 
elements permitted the Commission to serve as one of the few instances 
during the war where the two different philosophical schools among Union 
commanders came together in a general discussion of their military 
ideals, a discussion that revealed the lack of balance in each that was 
the essence of the Union command problem.
Beyond these basic points, the Commission served to summarize 
uniquely the battlefield faults of the two philosophical groups of 
Union command. Discussing the march to Chattanooga, the invasion of
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Kentucky, the pursuit of Bragg, and the conciliatory policy, the 
prosecution sought only the objective with little regard for science.
It indicated not only the art (risk) outlook needed in war that was 
noteworthy in the Grant-Sherman commander, but also the tendency to 
overemphasize warfare of momentum, of unscientific elan that was also 
a part of this type of Union general. In short, each topic underlined 
the essential philosophies of the Grant-Sherman general as they were 
revealed at Vicksburg, Kenesaw Mountain, Shiloh and many other major 
battles, as well as the relation of these positions to Jomini's and 
Saxe's "art-science" balance of war.
On the other hand, the defense illustrated only the science of 
war, with little regard for objectives and the enemy. It displayed not 
only the administrative, calculating, bloodless, efficient science that 
was a creditable trademark of generals like Buell and McClellan, but 
also their tendency to use science on the field as an end in itself and 
as a barrier against the enemy, rather than a flexible, efficient tool 
in moving towards the enemy and achieving military objectives as Jomini 
and Saxe's "art-science balance" theory had prescribed. In short, each 
topic captured the essence of the Buells and McClellans at Yorktown, 
Nashville, Chattanooga, Perryville, and most of the early major
encounters of the war.
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This study may be somewhat misleading, for it seems to imply 
that all Union generals suffered from one of the two defects discussed 
so extensively. But we can put the Union command problem in better 
perspective by acknowledging that it did not apply to all Northern 
generals. Not all fit neatly into either the incomplete Grant-Sherman 
category or the Buell-McClellan category. Some Union generals actually 
did come close to Jomini's and Saxe’s ideal, although such a commander 
was1 a rarity in the Union army. lie was then and remains an inconspicuous 
figure, due to his subordination to Grant, Buell, or other generals of 
higher command. This subordination was due to failure to capture the 
public eye, leading a smaller command, and achievements that— although 
successful— were overshadowed by the accomplishments and failures of 
his better known superiors,
George W. Morgan is a prime example. His name is not commonly 
associated with the Civil War, yet his three-month campaign in the 
Spring and Summer of 1862 against a well entrenched rebel force situated 
in the Cumberland Mountains reflected a brand of generalship that was 
superior in "completeness" to that found in most of the Union army. It 
was a "complete" campaign because Morgan adequately employed an equal 
combination of "natural artistry" (the initiative, audacity, and daring 
not found in books) that was the positive trademark of a Ulysses S. Grant, 
and the "scientific awareness" (the rules and the methodology of war), also 
needed in a commander, that was characteristic of a Don Carlos Buell.
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Moving against the enemy in the Cumberland Gap, Morgan demon­
strated the systematic science of war as well as Buell could have done, 
for he overcame his early inclination to storm one part of the enemy 
position and achieve quick victory. He decided instead to attempt a 
safer flanking movement when the enemy position was sufficiently 
bolstered to cause an unnecessary sacrifice of life if attacked from 
the front:
I reached Cumberland Ford on the 11th April and made a recon- 
naisance of the enemy's position at Cumberland Gap. It was evident 
that the enemy had grouped too many works on their left and depended 
too much on the natural strength of their right. Six hundred yards 
to the right of Fort Pitts I observed a knob which commanded that 
fort and Fort Mallory, and I was satisfied that that hill once in 
our possession, and occupied by seige guns, the gap was ours. I 
made a requisition for and obtained two 20 and two 30 pounder 
rParrott guns. . . .
Before the arrival of our seige guns Engineer Lea, of the rebel 
forces, constructed a strong work, protected by rifle pits, upon the 
summit, to the right of Fort Pitts, and convinced that the position 
could only be carried with immense loss of life, with keen regret 
I abandoned all idea of attacking the place from the front, and 
resolved to execute a flank movement and force the enemy to abandon 
his position. . . .1
The decision to outflank the enemy in this case, however, was 
also characteristic of the "natural artistry" and audacity of a Grant, 
for the decision required an acceptance of the harsh necessity of 
hauling one's army up and down a mountain in order to gain the enemy's 
rear. Specifically, the movement required Morgan to move his army to 
the west of Cumberland Gap and into Powell's Valley, a route that would 
cut off the enemy's line of retreat to Knoxville and at the same time 
make him vulnerable to attack. It was a route that was also inconceiva­
ble for the passage of an army, being "generally used as bridal-paths" 
up to that time and through which nothing heavier than "small wagons
Olightly laden had been known to pass." In his final report, Morgan
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described the hardship his army experienced in pushing through such a 
wilderness, at the same time reflecting the boldness which made him a 
natural artist of war:
I have advanced upon a road so narrow that two wagons cannot pass 
each other. The guns had to be drawn over several hills by block 
and tackle. A retrograde movement would be next to impossible.
. . . For miles a road had to be constructed as the column advanced. 
. . . The obstacles are great, but will be overcome. . . .  at many 
places the narrow roads, walled in by mountains, had become torrents, 
and sometimes the horses were obliged to swim. . . . Men were on 
half rations. To have three days ration ahead was a joy. . . .
It was amusing to witness the astonishment of the people at the 
passage of enormous cannon over roads regarded by them as difficult 
and dangerous for lightly-laden wagons. . . .
The ropes and pulleys were in constant use or readiness, and 
the men were obliged to be constantly on the alert, for the ascents 
were not only steep, but along places where, were the gun carriages 
once over turned, they would have fallen over precipitous rocks 
varying in height from 100-150 feet. . . .  In many instances were 
the turns in the road more than at right angles, and this up steep 
side long ascents, rendering it almost impossible to turn with 
teams. . . .
The road had become much worn out and rutted, loose stones fallen 
into the track and filled it in places, which had to be removed, and 
which rendered it almost impossible for horses to get a foothold.
. . . The 30 pound guns being so heavy, weighing 8000 pounds, were 
left at the top of the mountains, as the descent was too difficult 
to think for one moment of moving them down in the night.3
However, the science of war was not forgotten by Morgan in this 
unorthodox move across the Cumberland Mountains, for the methodology, 
efficiency, and organization that characterized the fundamental princi­
ples of war were clearly evident. Proper reconnaissance was observed 
in daily parties that were sent out to observe the enemy around and on 
the Gap; sometimes this reconnaissance lasted as long as a day and a 
half.^ Other reconnaissance observed and measured the surface of the 
land ahead of the army.^ In order to prevent enemy reinforcement of
the Gap from Knoxville and to "annoy the enemy's rear," a small partisan
£regiment was also organized and sent far ahead of the main army.
Morgan's plan also included a proper feint, as the textbooks suggested;
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three regiments moved fifteen miles west of the main army's route
(Roger's Gap) towards Big Creek Gap in the hope of confusing the enemy
as to Morgan's primary objective.'7 Roads through the mountain were
rebuilt to permit the army's passage, and then were carefully blocked
again as a precaution against possible enemy entrapment from the rear
8after the army had passed by. The problem of protecting supply lines, 
seemingly an impossible task when traveling over a mountain, with its 
narrow roads and valleys, was fully considered and dealt with, and 
considering the shortage of manpower, the solution was rather efficient 
"I now determined," wrote Morgan,
to withdraw my entire force from Cumberland Ford, and to cause the 
sides of the Pine Mountain to be mined, so that a hundred thousand 
itons of rock and trees could be hurled into the valley should the 
enemy attempt to strike at our line of s u p p l i e s .^
Scientific warfare was also illustrated by Morgan's careful 
preparation for attack after crossing the mountain and gaining the 
enemy's rear. He even considered and used (in one of the first times 
in war) field wire for telegraphic communication between brigades in 
case communication would otherwise be hampered by mountain fog on the 
day of the attack:
Heavy fogs, which sometimes last half a day, render signals useless 
I want sent to Quartermaster Brown, at Lexington, 30 miles of tele­
graph field cordage, with reel, to be there by the 8th instant.
The field wire asked for is to extend from the center to the 
flank of my line of battle, and possibly to the rear of the enemy. 
If the day were certain to be clear the wire would not be necessary 
but if there be fog, it will be to secure concert of action. The 
tortuous character of the mountain defiles renders a great length 
necessary. . . .  I wish to be prepared for every event.-*-®
This combination of science and natural artistry demonstrated 
by Morgan's careful moving of his army over a mountain, outflanking the 
enemy, and properly preparing for battle, resulted in a victory that
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although not particularly momentous as far as affecting the outcome of 
the war, was, for those who took proper notice, dazzling in its audacity 
and initiative and efficient in its scientific methodology. In short, 
in terms of my thesis, it was truly a complete campaign.
Morgan's effort also illustrated a successful combination that 
the majority of the generals of the Union army were simply unable to 
attain. It is hard to imagine Buell or McClellan, Rosecrans or Meade, 
displaying the initiative, the risk, the boldness, the natural artistry 
that eventually allowed Morgan to inform the Secretary of War that "the 
enemy evacuated this American Gibraltar this morning at 10 o'clock."'*''*'
It is just as inconceivable to find in Grant or Sherman the scientific 
awareness of war that would allow them to state after a campaign, as 
Morgan did,
Well, the Gap is ours, and without the loss of a single life.
I have since carefully examined the works, and I believe that the 
place could have been taken in a ten days' struggle from the front, 
but to have done so I should have left the bones of two-thirds of 
my gallant comrades to bleach upon the mountain s i d e .
However General Morgan, and other Union generals like him, did 
not alleviate the Union command problem; there simply were too few such 
men. Instead, he only accentuates the problem illustrated by the Buell 
Commission. Perhaps Morgan's most important service is to draw attention 
to what in final analysis is another dimension of the Civil War— the 
philosophical temperament of generals who inadequately controlled the 
destinies of thousands.
In its outcome the Buell Commission merely underlines the 
tragedy of the Civil War. Beginning with a sordid purpose, to convict 
in order to satisfy vengeful politicians, and continuing with proceedings
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that reflected the limited military philosophy prevalent in Union
command, it led to a somber result in the destruction of General Buell’s
military career. His career was destroyed not because of a verdict, for
there was no verdict; as if realizing that a mistake had been made in
ordering the formation of the court, Secretary of War Stanton simply
forgot the matter. Instead, Buell, with the same sense of insulted
pride that had found him walking stiffly in and out of the courtroom
and bristling with resentment during the proceedings,^ was unable to
accept the events that had transpired. Kept waiting without orders for
a year after the commission's close, then discharged from his volunteer
commission, he ended his own army career by resigning his regular com- 
14mission as well.
The effect of the Buell Commission on the conduct and final 
outcome of the Civil War was inconsequential, yet its importance 
continues to our own time. For the problem created by these two incom­
plete military philosophies are reflective of two types of generals and 
two differing modes of the conduct of war. Thus, the problem is a 
constant, changing only in degree from one war to another, and offers 
an understanding of war in general. In the world wars of the twentieth 
century for example, such generals as Ferdinand Foch, George Patton,
Sir John French, ahd Bernard Montgomery revealed viewpoints that were
their Grant-Sherman, Buell-McClellan predecessors.
The similarity is more than superficial. Foch, for example, was a 
major perpetrator of the concept of elan, of warfare of momentum with 
little regard for pcience, in World War I. His statement to his troops 
during the Battle of the Marne, when the situation was desperate and 
called for retreat ("Attack, whatever happens! The Germans are at the
similar to that of
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extreme limit of their efforts. . . . Victory will come to the side
that outlasts the other J")^ was remarkably similar to Grant's words
fifty-two years before at Shiloh. After being badly mauled on the first
day of battle, Grbnt ordered his men (as Sherman recalled) "to be ready
to assume the offensive in the morning, saying that, as he had observed
at Fort Donelson at the crisis of battle, both sides seemed defeated,
and whoever assumed the offensive was sure to w i n ."16 in World War II
George Patton understood this kind of warfare in his original use of
armor as a major tool of attack, and in his conclusion that the need to
go by the book and protect one's flanks was grossly over-inflated:
Forget this Gciddamn business of worrying about flanks. We must 
guard our flanks, but not to the extent that we don't do anything 
else. Some Gcjddamned fool once said that flanks must be secured, 
and since then sons of bitches all over the world have been going 
crazy guarding their flanks. We don't want any of that in the 
Third Army, blanks are something for the enemy to worry about, 
not u s .17
In World War I British commander Sir John French represented 
the Buell-McClellan type of the American Civil War. Barbara Tuchman 
describes him as a commander who feared battle and risk and who found 
excuses for not moving by concentrating on the book, science, and 
logistics of war:
From the moment he landed in France Sir John French began to exhibit 
a preference for the "waiting attitude," a curious reluctance to 
bring the BEF to action, a draining away of the will to fight. . .
But the sweat that comes from fear cannot be controlled, and 
Sir John was now gripped by fear of losing his army and with it his 
name and reputation. His troops were not, as he pretended, a 
broken army unfit for further effort. By their own account they 
were in no mooil to give up. 18
In World War II Betnard Montgomery was the same type of general: "He 
was always talking of 'quick' actions, yet he was a slow-motion general.
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He was always plan: 
repeatedly permit 
The Buell 
focusing on improp 
military command 
the madness of war
ning the entrapment and destruction of the enemy but 
ted him to escape by failing to close the trap."-^ 
Commission thus underlines the tragedy of all wars by 
er balance of military philosophy prevalent in 
In this regard it offers an important insight into
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GENERAL BUELL'S ORDER 13A
GENERAL ORDERS 
No. 13a,
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO, 
Nashville, Term., February 26, 1862.
The general commanding congratulates his troops that it has been their 
privilege to restore the national banner to the capital of Tennessee.
We believe that thousands of hearts in every part of the State will melt 
with joy to see that honored flag reinstated in a position from which it 
was removed in the excitement and folly of an evil hour; that the voice 
of her people will soon proclaim its welcome, and that their manhood and 
patriotism will protect and perpetuate it. The general does not deem it 
necessary, though the occasion is a fit one, to remind his troops of the 
rule of conduct they have hitherto observed and are still to pursue. We 
are in arms not for the purpose of invading the rights of our fellow- 
countrymen anywhere, but to maintain the integrity of the Union and 
protect the Constitution, under which its people have been prosperous 
and happy. We cannot, therefore, look with indifference on any conduct 
which is designed to give aid and comfort to those who are endeavoring 
to defeat these objects; but the action to be taken in such cases rests 
with certain authorized persons, and is not to be assumed by individual 
officers or soldiers. Peaceable citizens are not to be molested in 
their persons and property. Any wrongs to either are to be promptly 
corrected and the offenders brought to punishment.
To this end all persons are desired to make complaint to the immediate 
commander of officers and soldiers so offending, and if justice be not 
done promptly, then the next commander, and so on till the wrong is 
redressed. If the necessities of the public service should require the 
use of private property for public purposes fair compensation is to be 
allowed. No such appropriation of private property is to be made except 
by the authority of the highest commander present. [sic] and any other 
officer or soldier who shall presume to exercise such privilege shall 
be brought to trial. Soldiers are forbidden to enter the residences or 
grounds of citizens on any plea without authority. No arrests are to be 
made without the authority of the commanding general, except in case of 
actual offense against the authority of the Government, and in all such 
cases the fact and circumstance will immediately be reported in writing 
to headquarters through the intermediate commanders. The general reminds 
his officers that the most frequent depredations are those which are 
committed by worthless characters, who straggle from the ranks on the 
plea of not being able to march, and where the inability really exists 
it will be found in most instances that the soldier has overloaded him­
self with useless and unauthorized articles. The orders already
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published on this subject must be enforced. The condition and behavior 
of a corps are sure indications of the efficacy and fitness of its 
officers. If any regiments shall be found to disregard that propriety 
of conduct which belongs to soldiers as well as citizens, they must not 
expect to occupy the post of honor, but may rest assured that they will 
be placed in positions where they cannot bring shame on their commands 
and the cause they are engaged in. The Government supplies with liber­
ality all the wants of the soldier. The occasional depredations and 
hardships incident to rapid marches must be borne with patience and 
fortitude. Any officer who neglects to provide for his troops or 
separates himself to seek his own comfort will be held to a rigid 
accountability.
By order of General Buell:
JAMES B. FRY,
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